Labor Market Impacts of School Interruptions: A Dynamic, Structural Approach by Guo, Liang
Labor Market Impacts of School Interruptions: 














Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) at 
Concordia University 








©Liang Guo, 2018 
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES 




Labor Market Impacts of School Interruptions: A Dynamic, Structural Approach 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor Of Philosophy (Economics) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality. 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
Dr. Amy Swiffen 
Chair 
 External Examiner 
Dr. Nicolai Kristensen 
 External to Program 
Dr. Michel Magnan 
 Examiner 
Dr. Tatyana Koreshkova 
Examiner 
Dr. Damba Lkhagvasuren 
Thesis Supervisor (s) 
Dr. Jorgen Hansen 
Approved by 
Dr. Damba Lkhagvasuren, Graduate Program Director
July 10th, 2018 
Date of Defence 
Dr. André Roy, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science
ABSTRACT 
 
Labor Market Impacts of School Interruptions: A Dynamic, Structural Approach 
 
Liang Guo, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2018 
 
Schooling interruptions are common in North America and have recently attracted the 
attention of economists. In this paper, I provide structural estimates of a dynamic model of education 
and labor supply to investigate the impact of schooling interruptions on subsequent wage and 
employment outcomes. In this model, schooling interruptions evolve endogenously, and I 
approximate the expected value function using an approach suggested by Geweke and Keane (1996) 
that significantly reduces computational time. The results indicate that a temporary interruption to 
schooling attainment hurts post-graduation income relative to continuous investment in education, 
and consequently on the life-cycle income. However, even with an interruption, there are still 
significant wage gains from college and university relative to high school. Finally, the costs of 
interruptions and wage gains are heterogeneous and vary significantly across different racial groups 
and types of agents at both waves of NLSY. Using policy simulation, I find that under a post-
secondary schooling subsidy policy, up to 4 percent more white males from cohort 1979 will make a 
choice to return to school, 9.6 percent more of them will obtain a university-level degree, and the 
hourly wage will also increase up to 4.1 percent. Under the same post-secondary schooling subsidy 
policy simulation, the white males from 1997 cohort been more affected by the subsidy than their 
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A fundamental result of the conventional human capital model is that agents
have no incentive to delay or interrupt their educational investment, since the
opportunity cost increases with age, and the time horizon when returns on
the investment are realized is reduced. Nevertheless, the incidence of schooling
interruptions is widespread, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. For example, in one
of the ﬁrst economic studies of this topic, Light (1995) used data from the 1979
cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and reported
that around 34 percent of white males experience at least one interruption to
their educational attainment (regardless of the timing of the interruption). More
recently, from North american data, Johnson (2013) shows that roughly 25
percent of young Americans take a break from schooling after completing high
school and before enrolling in college or university. Similar patterns have been
observed in other countries.1
There are many potential reasons for interrupting educational attainment.
The conventional explanation is that students interested in pursuing a college
education may face ﬁnancial constraints and are unable to enroll in a post-
secondary education directly after high school. Instead, they need to work a
year or more to save up funds for their higher education. This issue has gained
attention recently following the signiﬁcant increases in direct costs of attending
college and university in the U.S. and is explored in detail in Johnson (2013).
Alternatively, students may not be immediately interested in continuing their
education following high school graduation but realize after a period of non-
enrollment that they would like to return, either to improve their labor market
prospects or because of a direct beneﬁt from the activity itself. In this paper,
I seek to determine the impact of interrupting educational investments on sub-
1See for example Foley and Groes (2016), Dominic and Netz (2011) for Europen evidence
and Finnie and Qiu (2008),Tomkowicz and Bushnik (2003)for Canadian experiences.
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sequent wage outcomes. As mentioned above, a mechanism illustrated in the
human capital literature is that any delay in investing in education will reduce
the overall life-cycle beneﬁt, as it reduces the time available to take advantage
of the investment. That is, compared to continuous investment, an interrup-
tion is predicted to reduce the beneﬁt of the obtained education. However, the
eﬀect does not necessarily have to be negative. For example, if an individual
is gaining skills and experience during the interruption that complements the
skills acquired during college, the eﬀect may be positive. Students who return
to school may also be more motivated, interested and engaged in their studies
compared to those who continuously invest and thereby enjoy more signiﬁcant
returns. Further, as was also mentioned above, working during the interrup-
tion period may enable individuals to enroll in college; something they would
otherwise not be able to do due to ﬁnancial constraints. If we consider labor
market outcomes for those with a high school degree only with those who return
after an interruption and graduate from college, we obtain another measure of
the beneﬁt of returning to school. Thus, the potential beneﬁt of an interruption
depends on the comparison group, and there are two groups we need to consider
when evaluating the returns to returning to school: those who achieve the same
level of education but without interruption and those who choose not to return
to school. Even if the life-cycle income for the returners does not entirely match
the one for the ﬁrst comparison group, it may well exceed that of the second
group. Hence, the eﬀect of interruption may be positive, both when holding
total years of education constant and when considering the opportunity it gives
to further invest in education. Regardless of the reasons for, and the poten-
tial eﬀects of, an interruption, it is reasonable to believe that the decision is
intrinsically linked to, and plays a signiﬁcant role in, the overall human capital
accumulation process. It is, therefore, necessary to include this option as a deci-
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sion variable whose outcome is endogenously related to labor market outcomes,
such as wages and labor supply. For example, a negative wage or employment
shock for someone who ﬁnished high school but did not continue beyond that
level may incentivize that person to return to school, an option he would not
have exercised in the absence of the shock if his optimal choice then was to
enter the labor market after high school. Thus, there may be a selectivity issue
involved which needs to be considered when estimating the returns to returning.
Even though schooling interruptions are frequent, the economic literature
on this topic is sparse. One of the ﬁrst papers to investigate both the incidence
of interruption as well as its eﬀect on wages is Light (1995). Using data from
the NLSY79 for the period 1979 to 1989, she estimated wage regressions allow-
ing for diﬀerent growth rates before and after students' re-enroll. Her results
suggest that those who temporarily interrupted their educational attainment
had slightly lower wages than their counterparts who acquired their education
continuously. A more recent paper by Johnson (2013) also ﬁnds that a signif-
icant share of individuals delays their post-secondary education. He also used
the NLSY but data from the younger 1997 cohort instead and reports that a
one-year delay in college enrolment may cost agents more than $9,000 in lost
lifetime income. He also ﬁnds that those who delayed their schooling were gener-
ally from low-income families and belonged to minority ethnic groups. However,
unlike Light (1995), he does not consider the possibility that wage growth may
diﬀer between those who invest continuously and those who interrupt. In this
thesis, I expand the analyses of both Light (1995) and Johnson (2013) in several
critical dimensions. First, I develop an economic model for educational choices
and labor supply with forward-looking behavior where the decision to interrupt
is an integral part and where the wage function is deﬁned in a very ﬂexible fash-
ion to allow for diﬀerent growth rates before and after re-enrollment. Secondly,
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I introduce unobserved heterogeneity in a ﬂexible way to address the potential
selectivity and endogeneity issues discussed above. While Johnson (2013) also
considers these issues, they are absent in Light (1995). Thirdly, I expand the
time horizon in my model using the 1979 cohort to consider data collected up
to, and including 2010. It is again an extension of Light (1995) who did not
utilize data after 1989 and the adoption of a long panel (up to 30 periods) is also
diﬀerent from Johnson (2013). These expansions provide a general framework
for analyzing the long-term impact on wages from schooling interruptions where
the decisions to temporarily interrupt school is endogenous. Moreover, the use
of a longer time horizon is critical to identify longer-term impacts of school inter-
ruptions. Fourth, I combine data from both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 to both
describe if the incidence and duration of school interruptions have changed over
time and to asses if the impact of interruption on wages and lifetime income has
changed. Finally, using data from NLSY79 and NLSY97, I estimate the model
separately for white, black and Hispanic males to analyze any racial diﬀerences
in interruptions and their eﬀects. Another unique aspect of the research con-
ducted in this thesis is that it considers temporary disruptions to schooling at
any level of study and is not limited to delayed college entries as much of the
previous literature has focused on.
The NLSY data is well suited for the analysis in this thesis. In addition to
providing data on labor market activities and outcomes over a long time horizon,
it also contains detailed information on critical socio-economic characteristics,
such as parental education and income, household composition and measures of
cognitive ability. The data also allows me to follow each from the age of 16 when
I start modeling choices (enroll in school, work or NEET (Not in Education,
Employment or Training)) until age 33 or 46, depending on the cohort.2
2In the NLSY79, I observe individuals for up to 30 years while in the NLSY97, I can
follow them for 17 years (due to the fact that they were initially interviewed in 1997). In the
analysis that compares choices and outcomes of the two cohorts, I limited the NLSY79 data
4
Educational and labor supply decisions are generated from a model that
has a ﬁnite horizon and is solved by backward recursions, where each chose the
option in each period that maximizes the discounted present value of expected
lifetime utility. I approximate the expected value function using an approach
suggested by Geweke and Keane (1995) that signiﬁcantly reduces computational
time. The parameters of the model are estimated using Maximum Likelihood
techniques and the model's predictive behavior is assessed by comparing actual
and model-generated choices. I show that a temporary interruption to schooling
has an adverse eﬀect on an individual's future income compared to completing
the same level of education without interruption. Precisely, the average dif-
ference in present value earnings for those without and with an interruption 
assuming a one-year interruption between high school and college during which
the individual is working  equals $35,712. The impact of a gap year is quite
heterogeneous, and the diﬀerence in present value earnings can be as low as
$5,000 over a 30-year period (for one group or type of individuals) and as high
as $48,000 over the same period (for another group). However, and as elaborated
above, those who return to school do realize an economic beneﬁt to that activ-
ity compared to those who do not return to school, even though it is smaller
than the one that applies to those who acquire their education without any
breaks. For example, based on NLSY793,the estimated average high school-
college earnings diﬀerence is 26 percent without interruption and 12 percent
with an interruption4.
An important aspect and focus of this thesis is the inequality in educational
outcomes and wages that exist across diﬀerent ethnic groups in the U.S. This
to 17 periods.
3Data of NLSY79 White agents.
4In the NLSY97, the estimated average high school-college earning diﬀerence is 38 and 28
percent.
Again, this return varies across individuals, especially for those with an interruption where
the college earnings premium is as low as 1.7 percent for some individuals.
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is also a critical topic for economists with vast literature, primarily focused on
black-white racial diﬀerences. However, attention to Hispanics, the third largest
racial group in the United States, has been more limited. This research attempts
to ﬁll some of this gap by carefully analyzing racial diﬀerences in educational
attainment, future economic outcomes, and labor supply as well as providing
impact results from policy simulations designed to improve outcomes of the mi-
nority groups. The data from NLSY show that both the high school graduation
rates and the university graduation rates diﬀer enormously among these three
major racial groups. For white males in the NLSY79, it is 85 percent, which
is much higher than the corresponding rate for black males (72.5 percent) and
Hispanic males (63 percent). The diﬀerence in the rate of university accom-
plishment based on the same data is even more signiﬁcant. Approximately 26
percent of white males obtained a university degree compared to only 11 percent
of black males and 12 percent of Hispanic males. Regarding school interruptions,
data show that 36 percent of white males have at least one interruption which is
less than the rate for both black males (close to 40 percent) and Hispanic males
(39 percent). It indicates a possible relationship between the incidence of school
interruptions and family income and access to ﬁnancial support (which on av-
erage is much lower among blacks and Hispanics than among whites). When
analyzing how the eﬀect of a temporary interruption to schooling adversely im-
pacts the present value of future earnings, I ﬁnd that the diﬀerential is $21,586
for white males, $23,419 for black males and $15,329 for Hispanic males5.
Base on NLSY79, the college premia for those without (with) and interrup-
tion are: 26.3 (12.8) percent for whites, 49.0 (32.7) percent for blacks and 50.1
(22.6) percent for Hispanics. Thus, the economic returns to a college degree for
any of the two minority groups are substantial, regardless of the path towards
that degree. Moreover, the racial gaps in hourly income at age 32 are substan-
5It based on NLSY79 (at age 49).
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tial for those without any education beyond high school: close to 28 percent
for the white-black diﬀerence and 25 percent for the white-Hispanic diﬀerence.
Among college-educated workers, the corresponding numbers are 8-9 percent for
the white-black earnings gap and 9-15 percent for the white-Hispanic wage gap.
The similar trend is found in NLSY97, black and Hispanics agents do beneﬁt
more than their white counterpart does from a college degree weather with or
without interruption. The college premia for those without (with) and interrup-
tion are: 18.0 (12.0) percent for whites, 33.1 (23.2) percent for blacks and 34.1
(33.3) percent for Hispanics. From NLSY97, the racial gaps in wage at age 32
are substantial as in the NLSY79, for those without any education beyond high
school: close to 29 percent for the white-black diﬀerence and 36 percent for the
white-Hispanic diﬀerence. Among college-educated workers, the corresponding
numbers are 14-17 percent for the white-black earnings gap and 14-19 percent
for the white-Hispanic wage gap.
As is well known, an essential advantage of estimating a structural model
of education and labor supply is that it provides an opportunity to conduct
counter-factual policy simulations and analyze impacts of the policies on labor
market outcomes. In this thesis, I consider two alternative policies, both with
empirical relevance. The ﬁrst is a policy where students are not allowed to leave
school until they have graduated from high school and the second one is the
introduction of an economic subsidy, conditional on college enrollment. Both
policies may impact educational attainment and the decisions to interrupt and
return to school. The forced high school graduation will eliminate the decision
to drop out of high school and the possibility of returning to complete a high
school diploma. The subsidy may provide suﬃcient funds for some to decide
to continue directly from high school to college by lowering the cost thereby
reducing the incidence of interruptions. It may also increase the fraction of
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individuals returning to college after having left school, again by increasing the
aﬀordability of college.
The results suggest that subsidies will increase the average level of education,
life-cycle income, and lead to a signiﬁcantly higher post-secondary graduation
rate (a 17 percent increase in the graduation rate of four-year universities). The
rate of school interruptions increases by about 4 percent. There are also critical
racial dimensions to the estimated impacts. For instance, blacks and Hispanics
from the 1979 cohort were twice as likely to be aﬀected by the college subsidy.
Average education among black males increases with three years to a total of
14 years (corresponding to an associated degree). Hispanic males gain a 2.5-
year increase in average education and also reach 14. Also, importantly, the
diﬀerences between wages and unemployment rates between whites, blacks and
Hispanics are almost eliminated. Similar results were also found for the NLSY97
cohort.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, I present
a literature review that will describe in more detail some of the pertinent re-
search in this area and deﬁne the context in which this thesis should be viewed.
The structural, dynamic model is presented in Section 3 where I describe the
speciﬁcations of the instantaneous utility functions, the evolution of the state
variables and the individual's optimization problem. In Section 4, I present the
data including sample selections, variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics
and various features of the data. The estimation strategy is illustrated in the
following section with a derivation of the likelihood function. Sections 6 contain
presentations of the results. The model ﬁt, counterfactual policy simulations




2.1 School Interruptions and Delayed College Entry
Temporary interruptions to schooling are common in many parts of the world
and have been a feature of human capital investment paths for many years. As
such, it has also been the focus of research by economists who have attempted
to understand the reasons behind these events. The primary explanation is due
to the possibility of economic constraints preventing individuals from acquiring
education in a continuous fashion, in particular, higher education. Consequently,
much of the existing literature in this area has focused on interruptions following
the completion of high school. For example, Heckman (1996) used the NSLY79
data to show that individuals are more likely to interrupt their college education
in states with higher tuition fees.
However, data from NLSY79 also show that although the majority of in-
terruptions occur after high school, many take place following the completion
of other grades (from grade 9 up to grade 19). It suggests that other reasons
may also contribute to these interruptions, as students are less likely to be ﬁ-
nancially constrained while attending grades 10 and 11. Further, the fact that
these interruptions are also a standard feature in the Scandinavian countries,
where higher education is provided at little cost, suggests that this is an issue
that arises because of other (non-ﬁnancial) reasons as well.
An early study on this topic that considered interruptions at diﬀerent grade
levels was conducted by Light (1995). Using data for the period from 1979
to 1989 from the NLSY79, she examined the wage eﬀects of a series of non-
traditional enrollment patterns. Speciﬁcally, she estimated a wage regression
that allowed individuals to follow a diﬀerent wage path before and after their re-
enrollment. Using a Hausman and Taylor procedure to account for the potential
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endogeneity of education, she estimates coeﬃcients that are associated both with
schooling received before an interruption takes place (if at all) and with schooling
that is obtained after an interruption (the second enrollment spell). Her results
suggest that the decision to return to school is only related to time-invariant
personal characteristics and not with transitory wage shocks (something that
has been found to be relevant in more recent studies see discussion of Johnson
(2013) below). Further, the return to a certain level of education is smaller
for those who interrupt their schooling compared to those who acquired their
education without any breaks and the more prolonged students wait before re-
enrolling, the smaller is the return. Light (1995) also reports that although
there exists a signiﬁcant initial wage gap between interrupters (or returners)
and non-interrupters, this wage diﬀerence gets smaller over time due to faster
wage growth among the returners.
Also, using the NLSY79 but with a slightly more extended observation pe-
riod than Light (1995), Monk (1997) studied the age at the time of college
completion. The paper investigated the importance of the timing of schooling
in determining earnings and reported that those who complete college at a later
age receive a signiﬁcantly smaller initial increase in earnings than those who
acquire their education earlier in life. Similar to Light (1995) but unlike the
analysis in this thesis, Monk (1997) did not consider or control for activities
during the (schooling) gap years.
Stratton et al. (2008), based on the American 1990/94 Beginning Post-
secondary Survey (BPS:90/94), analyzed factors related to three ﬁrst-year en-
rollment choices: continuous schooling, temporary interruption (less than one
year), and a long-term interruption to schooling (one year or more). They used a
multinomial logit model to study which factors may explain the diﬀerent choices
made by the agents. They found signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the factors asso-
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ciated with the short-term and long-term interruptions to schooling and argued
that the probability of a long-term interruption is higher for those who receive
loans and lower for those who receive work-study government aid as compared
to those who receive no aid. Further, students with less educated parents (high
school or less) are less likely to enroll continuously in college and more likely to
interrupt (and dropout). A similar ﬁnding was reported for students with low
GPAs.
In contrast to the results in Light (1995) and others as well as somewhat
counter-intuitive, Ferrer and Menendez (2014) found that graduates (both col-
lege and university) who temporarily interrupted their education received a
lifetime income premium compared to graduates who continuously invested in
school, even after considering other factors such as work experience or labour
market connections. Their results are based on data extracted from the 1995
cohort of the Canadian National Survey of Graduates which collects data on
graduates in 1997 and 2000. Thus, the wages observed are those associated with
labor market activities within the ﬁrst few years of graduation. The authors
speculate that higher wages for interrupters relative to the non-interrupters are
due to the possibility for the former group to uncover some of the uncertainty
about future labor market outcomes and consequently make a more informed
educational decision than those who continue directly from high school.
Using data from the same survey (The Canadian National Graduate Sur-
vey) as Ferrer and Menendez (2014) but a more recent cohort (the 2007 cohort),
Fortin and Ragued (2017) also argued that the delay of schooling is not necessar-
ily associated with a penalty on future income. They investigate how temporary
schooling interruptions aﬀect future wages and how future outcomes depend on
the activity during, and reasons for, a temporary interruption to schooling.
They found a positive eﬀect on wages from a temporary schooling interruption
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for males who worked full-time during the gap period but an adverse wage ef-
fect if the temporary schooling interruption was associated with health issues.
Both Ferrer and Menendez (2014) and Fortin and Ragued (2017) analyze the
impact of interruptions on wages soon (within two years) after graduation and
are unable to explore any long-term eﬀects. Further, the use of wages within
the ﬁrst few years after graduation may bias the wage impact of an interruption
in favor of those who interrupt if the job-matching process takes time and those
with previous work experience can obtain jobs that match their qualiﬁcations
faster than those without such experiences.
In an exciting and relevant paper using Danish national population admis-
sion data for the years, 1981 to 2009, Foley and Gores (2012) also study the
eﬀects of a delay or a temporary interruption of education on income with a
focus on diﬀerences across ﬁelds of study. They formulate a dynamic economic
model whereby individuals form expectations about their future incomes be-
fore they decide whether or not to interrupt. They report overall adverse wage
eﬀects from interruptions, and since income proﬁles diﬀer across ﬁelds, there
is heterogeneity in the wage penalties across ﬁelds of study. It also impacts
the incidence of interruptions. For example, students in humanities are three
times more likely to delay university than engineering students, and the pri-
mary reason for this is that interruptions are costlier regarding lost earnings for
engineering students than for humanities students. However, ﬁelds of study and
ﬁnancial status cannot entirely explain an agent's decision to interrupt school-
ing which is also determined by, in their data, unobserved variables (such as
scholastic ability).
Some studies have investigated and focused on the relationship between the
decision to delay schooling and the socio-economic background of students. For
example, Wells and Lynch (2012) argued that the delay of schooling is related
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to family income, parental education, and parental occupation. They also re-
ported that delaying entry into college signiﬁcantly decreases the likelihood of
completing a bachelor's degree. Similar ﬁndings are reported in Bozick and
DeLuca (2005) and Kenyon (2007) who argued that students from low socio-
economic backgrounds are less likely to attend college immediately after high
school.
Butler (2016), based on the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002),
suggested that only six percent of individuals who delayed college entry earned
a bachelor's degree compared to 42 percent for those who began college im-
mediately after high school graduation. Further, 21 percent of the sampled
individuals delayed entry to college, and black and Hispanic students were more
likely to delay than white students. Among those who delayed entry, the pri-
mary factors for this decision were parental education and college costs. On the
labor market side, students who delayed enrollment earned 28 percent less than
those who entered directly from high school. Those who delayed were also less
likely to hold professional or managerial positions in the workplace.
Niu and Tienda (2013) investigated how college postponement is associated
with four-year college enrollment using a representative longitudinal survey of
Texas high school seniors who graduated in 2002. They argued that the decision
to delay college was aﬀected not only by family background characteristics but
also by the student's academic ability. They also found that delays of one year
or more are associated with signiﬁcantly lower odds of re-enrollment.
Finally, based on the NLSY97, Johnson (2013) proposed a dynamic model
of college enrollment and completion, labor force participation, and savings to
study schooling decisions. He ﬁnds that 25 percent of those who leave school for
one or more semesters re-enroll. He also estimates that the loss of the present
value of lifetime income of a one year delay in college enrollment equals $ 9,000.
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Further, Johnson (2013) argues that students who delay their schooling do not
necessarily take this action because they are ﬁnancially constrained. Instead,
the decisions may be driven by shocks to preferences for schooling and changes
in the opportunity cost of schooling caused by unemployment or negative wage
shocks.
2.2 Racial diﬀerences in Education
The over-arching inequality problem for black and Hispanics has been intensively
discussed in the United States and the topic has been vastly researched, espe-
cially by sociologists, and many of the references in this section are drawn from
that literature. Some papers argue that diﬀerences in the family background
could explain why black people in general, have lower educational attainment
and lower income than their white counterparts. For example, Gamoran (2001)
points out that the gap in high school graduation rates for whites and blacks
is falling, but the graduation rates of the university or higher education for the
same groups remain unbalanced. He believes that socioeconomic diﬀerences are
the primary factor for black-white inequality in educational attainment. He
argues (and demonstrates) that white parents tend to have higher levels of ed-
ucational attainment and income than blacks' parents.
From the analysis of six large data sets collected between 1965 and 1996
using national probability samples of adolescents, Hedges and Nowell (1999)
found that about a third of the gap in test scores was accounted for by racial
diﬀerences in social class. Jencks and Phillips (1998) also support the idea that
racial diﬀerences in social class are the main reason for educational inequality.
They believe that policies designed to increase the funding for schools and reduce
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class sizes in the early grades of schooling will beneﬁt blacks more than whites
and may, therefore, improve educational equality.
Grissmer et al. (1994) estimate the net eﬀect of changing family charac-
teristics and demographics on aptitude scores and ﬁnd that changing family
characteristics would boost scores by about seven percentile points. Higher
parental education and smaller family size are the main factors that aﬀect a
student's educational scores. They also claim that more government investment
in school resources will beneﬁt educational attainment, especially for Hispanic
and black students.
Heckman (2011) generally agrees with this proposal. He argues that long-
term factors (including parental education) are important determinants of stu-
dent achievements while short-term ﬁnancial support at the post-secondary level
will have a more limited eﬀect. A couple of older studies provide an interesting
historical perspective on this issue. Coleman and Blum (1970 and 1972) note
that unlike non-black males, whose educational attainment is not aﬀected by
family background characteristics, the educational attainment of black males is
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by their mothers' education. They also show that wage
growth for blacks and non-blacks diﬀer, with higher growth rates among non-
blacks, despite a similar starting wage.
Finally, Keane and Wolpin (2000) provide an analysis of diﬀerent policies
aimed at reducing the disparity in schooling and earnings across racial groups.
They estimate a dynamic, structural model using data on males from NLSY79
and test two policy proposals: ﬁrst, the provision of a high school graduation
bonus to males from low-income families; and second, oﬀering wage subsidies
to low-wage workers. The ﬁrst policy proposal has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on both
black and white males, whereby black males can beneﬁt more from the policy
with the rate of having a cited degree even higher than for white males.
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3 Model
The model described in this section provides a framework for analyzing the
long-term impact of schooling interruptions on wages where the decision to
return to school is endogenous. It deviates from how the existing literature has
approached this issue, where many studies have ignored the possible selectivity
embedded in the interruption decision. It is inspired by the model presented in
Belzil et al. (2017) and shares many similarities with that one. However, it has
been signiﬁcantly modiﬁed to accommodate the unique features that the focus
on interruptions entails.
To accomplish this, I assume that individuals make a choice at the beginning
of each period in order to maximize the expected value of their state-speciﬁc
lifetime utility. I deﬁne a time period as a calendar year, with a total of up to
30 time periods included in the model.6 The initial period, when an individual
starts to make choices(t1), is the year he turns 16. However, because of attrition
and diﬀerent ages at the initial interview, not all individuals are observed for
the entire sample period (around 66 percent of respondents in the 1979 cohort
were observed for all 30 periods).
3.1 Choice set
There are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive options available in each
period: school enrollment, employment and a residual, absorbing state reﬂecting
NEET time and . I refer to this state as Not Enrolled, Employed or in Training
(NEET). For each individual i, the choice in period t is represented by the binary
6In the initial analysis, where I focus an a sample of white males from the 1979 cohort
(similar to that used by Light (1995)), I am able to track a majority of the respondents for
30 periods. For the analysis that compares choices and outcomes over time, using data from
both NLSY cohorts, I limit the number of time periods in the 1979 cohort to 17 (which is the
maximum available for the 1997 cohort). This is done so that the time frame is similar for
the two cohorts.
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indicators dki;t, where d
k
i;t = 1 when option k is chosen in period t, where k 2 K,
and K = fs; e;NEETg. Thus, dsi;t = 1 if individual i is enrolled in school in
period t, dsi;t = 0 otherwise; d
e
i;t = 1 if he is employed in period t, d
e
i;t = 0
otherwise; and ﬁnally dNEETi;t = 1 if individual i is not enrolled in school or
employed in period t, dNEETi;t = 0 otherwise.
3.2 State variables
The vector of state variables for each individual in period t is denoted as:

i;t =fXi; cog; typei; S1i;t 1 ; S2i;t 1 ; E1i;t 1 ; E2i;t 1 ; NEETi;t 1; dst 1i;t 1;
d(si;t 1 = 1); d(si;t 1 = 2); d(si;t 1 = 3); d(si;t 1 = 4);
d(s1i;t 1 = 1); d(s1i;t 1 = 2); d(s1i;t 1 = 3); d(s1i;t 1 = 4);
d(s2i;t 1 = 1); d(s2i;t 1 = 2); d(s2i;t 1 = 3); d(s2i;t 1 = 4);
dgapi;t 1; dgapduri;t 1; Si;t 1; Ei;t 1g;
where Xi includes observed socioeconomic information, such as number of
siblings, presence of both biological parents, parental education, parent's income
(in 1997 U.S. dollar), and geographical location:7
Xi = fNSIBi; I (NUCLEARi = 1) ; I (SOUTHi = 1) ; I(RURALi = 1);
I(RURALi = 1); HGCFi; HGCMi; HINCOMEig;
The agent's cognitive and non-cognitive scores are represented by abilityi
7NSIBi is the number of siblings, NUCLEARi is an indicator that is equal to 1 if individ-
ual i was living in a nuclear family (living with both biological parents at age 14), 0 otherwise.
SOUTHi is an indicator that is equal to 1 if individual i was living in a southern state, 0
otherwise. RURALi is an indicator that is equal to 1 if individual i was living in a rural
area, 0 otherwise. HGFMi is the highest education individual i
0s father obtained. HGCMi
is the highest education individual i0s mother obtained. HINCOMEi is the total income of
individual i0s parents. With the exception of HINCOME, all variables are measured in the
ﬁrst period.
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while his permanent unobserved heterogeneity is given by typei. S1;i;t,S2;i;t;
E1;i;t,E2;i;tand Hi;t describe the accumulated number of periods occupied in
school, employment and NEET, respectively. dgapi;t is a binary indicator vari-
able that equals one if the individual has experienced a schooling interruption
(or a gap) in period t and dgap_dui;t is the duration of such an interruption,
also measured in period t.
Further, d (si;t = k) ;k = 1; 2; 3 and 4 are binary indicators for the highest
grade (high school, some college, college and post-college) completed at the
beginning of period t:
d(si;t = 1) = I (Si;t = 12)
d(si;t = 2) = I (13  Si;t  14)
d(si;t = 3) = I (15  Si;t  16)





are binary indicators for the highest grade (high school, some
college, college and post-college) completed at the beginning of period t in the
ﬁrst schooling span:




d(s1i;t = 2) = I
 
13  S1i;t  14

d(s1i;t = 3) = I
 
15  S1i;t  16










are binary indicators for the highest grade (high school,
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some college, college and post-college) completed at the beginning of period t
in the second schooling span as:




d(s2i;t = 2) = I
 
13  S2i;t  14

d(s2i;t = 3) = I
 
15  S2i;t  16







At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, each agent is endowed with a set of
both observed and unobserved characteristics. The individual's socio-economic
status is permanent and given by his family environment at this time (Xi). The
ability measures (cognitivei) are also assumed to be time-invariant. Perma-
nent unobserved heterogeneity is represented by the individual's type (detailed
below).
The initial value of Si, (Si;0) is the grade completed at age 16, while Ei;0
and NEETi;0 are both equal to zero.
3.4 Laws of motion
The laws of motion of accumulated education, work experience, and NEET
are deﬁned as follows:
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if dgapi;t = 0




if dgapi;t = 1




if dgapi;t = 0




if dgapi;t = 1







In this model, individuals are assumed to maximize the expected value of
lifetime utility when they make their choices at the beginning of each period.
The state-speciﬁc utilities are described below.
3.5.1 Utility of school
The instantaneous utility associated with attending school in period t is denoted












+sds1d(si;t = 1) + 
s
ds2d(si;t = 2) + 
s





where sm is the permanent observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity
for type m in terms of the utility of attending school. sg captures the potential
cost associated with returning to school while sgapdur captures the possibility






sds4 capture the diﬀerences in the utility of attending school across the four dif-
ferent schooling levels. The four parameters describe how the cost of attending
school evolves at the diﬀerent levels of education.sX , x = 1; :::; 7 describe how
the utility of enrolling in school varies across diﬀerent socioeconomic background
characteristics. Finally, "si;t is a stochastic utility shock.
3.5.2 Utility of working
The instantaneous utility of working, denoted as Uei;t, is deﬁned as:
Uei;t = 
e









where em is the time-invariant, type-speciﬁc utility shifter and lnwi;t is the
expected log-wage in period t. The parameters es1 and 
e
s2 captures the direct
eﬀects of education on the utility of working (in addition to the indirect eﬀect
of education through the expected log-wage), whereas ee measures the state-
dependence in working. "ei;t is a stochastic utility shock.
3.5.3 Utility of NEET
The utility of NEET is denoted as UNEETt and is normalized to zero and
serves as a reference group.
3.6 Wages
Individual wages depend on schooling, labor market experience and any
interruption in schooling. In addition to the occurrence of an interruption, the
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duration of the interruption or gap is included since longer gaps may reduce
subsequent wages. In order to capture potential diﬀerences in wage growth
for those with and without a gap, education and experience before and after
a schooling interruption are included in the wage function. Speciﬁcally, the
















+ws11d(s1 = 1)i;t + 
w
s12d(s1 = 2)i;t
+ws13d(s1 = 3) + 
w
s14d(s1 = 4)i;t + 
w
s21d(s2 = 1)i;t
+ws22d(s2 = 2)i;t + 
w
s23d(s2 = 3)i;t + 
w
s24d(s2 = 4)i;t




where S1i;tE1i;t , S1i;tE2i;t and S2i;tE1i;t are the arrays of interaction terms
of pre- and post-interruption schooling (at diﬀerent educational levels) with
working experience at time period t:




e1s11E1i;td(s1 = 1)i;t + 
w
e1s12E1i;td(s1 = 2)i;t








e2s11E2i;td(s1 = 1)i;t + 
w
e2s12E2i;td(s1 = 2)i;t









e2s21E2i;td(s2 = 1)i;t + 
w
e2s22E2i;td(s2 = 2)i;t




Further, wm is a type-speciﬁc, permanent unobserved heterogeneity. 
w
s1p
and ws2p where p = 1,2,3 and 4 capture the return to pre- and post-interruption
education according to diﬀerent education levels. we1 and 
w
e2 represent the
growth shifts of the log-wage for the pre- and post-interruption work experience.s1e1
and s1e2 show how pre- and post-interruption wage growth depend on pre-
interruption levels of schooling. s2e2 show the extent to which working during
an interruption to schooling impacts the return to post-interruption schooling.
we12 and 
w
e22 allow for non-linear growth rates in E1 and E2, respectively.
Finally, "wi;t is an idiosyncratic, stochastic wage shock that follows a ﬁrst






vwi;t  N (0; 2)
 2 (0; 1):
3.7 Permanent observed and unobserved heterogeneity






on the agent's cognitive test score, cogi, and is speciﬁed as follows:













w  cogi: (11)
Following the standard approach in the structural, dynamic discrete choice
literature, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity distribution is approx-
imated by a multivariate discrete distribution. Thus, each type individual i is
endowed with the following set:
	 = fasi;type=m; aei;type=m; wi;type=mg
m 2 M
M = f1; 2; 3; 4g
where the probability of belonging to a speciﬁc type is deﬁned by the following
logistic transformation:
Pr(type = mjSi;0) = pm = exp(m + msSi;0)PM
j=1 exp(j + js  Si;0)
; (12)
where Si;0 is the initial level of schooling for individual i. m and ms are
parameters to be estimated and represent the intercept term and the weight of
the initial schooling for individual i, respectively, in terms of the probability of
belonging to type m. Parameters M and Ms are normalized to zero.
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3.8 Value functions
As mentioned above, the model assumes that agents are forward-looking
and considers the impact of current choices on future outcomes. Therefore,
the choice-speciﬁc, instantaneous utility functions described above need to be
adjusted to account for expectations in terms of future utility and wage shocks.
Speciﬁcally, the objective of individual i in any period t, t = 1; :::; T is to choose











k = fs, e, NEETg ;
where  is the discount factor and E is the expectations operator. Using a
Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957), this complex dynamic optimization problem
can be reduced to sequences of two period problems and solved recursively.



























for t = 1; :::; T   1 and
Vi;T (
i;T ) = maxk=fs;e;NEETgUki;T ; (16)
for period T and where Vi;t (
i;t) denotes the value function. Starting from
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the last period, it is straightforward to use backwards recursions to solve the







this expectation does not in general have a convenient solution, by assuming






















i;t+1) =  +  lnG; (17)
















where  is a parameter of the extreme value distribution and  is Euler's con-
stant. What remains is to integrate out the wage shocks from the expression
above, and this can be done by approximating the integral using simulated draws
from the distribution of wage shocks and averaging the simulated conditional








Finally, normalizing  to one, the choice probabilities implied by the model
assumptions, Pr(dki;t = 1), are deﬁned as:
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U ji;t + 
bi;t+1 (
i;t+1) (20)
k; j = s; e;NEET
k 6= j:
Evaluating i;t+1 (
i;t+1) at all possible combinations of state variables for
all applicable time periods and for all draws of the wage error distribution is com-
putationally very demanding, despite the limited number of options available
in each time period. To overcome this issue, I approximate the i;t+1 (
i;t+1)
function using a polynomial in state variables, following Geweke and Keane
(1996) and Geweke et al. (1999). Speciﬁcally:
ei;t+1 (










%9S1i;t+1S2i;t+1 + %10E1i;t+1E2i;t+1 +
%11S1i;t+1E1i;t+1 + %12S2i;t+1E2i;t+1 +
%13S1i;t+1E2i;t+1 + S2i;t+1E1i;t+1 :
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4 Data
The empirical part of this thesis is based on samples from the 1979 and 1997
cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79, NLSY97). In
this section, I ﬁrst provide a brief description of each survey. This is followed by
details on variable deﬁnitions and descriptions of diﬀerent aspects of the data.
4.1 NLSY79
NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 males and females
who were between 14 to 22 years old when they were ﬁrst surveyed in 1979.
After 1979, follow-up interviews were conducted annually until 1994 after which
it became a biannual survey. NLSY79 gathers information in an event history
format, in which dates are collected for the beginning and end of signiﬁcant
life events. Information includes the start and end dates for each job or school
period held since the last interview. Because an individual's work and schooling
histories are collected in this manner, measures of actual labor market experi-
ence can be constructed. Prior to any selections, NLSY79 contained 7,510 white
agents, 3,174 black agents , and 2,002 Hispanic agents.
Since I am focusing on educational attainment, including high school dropouts,
I remove individuals who were older than 18 at the time of the ﬁrst survey in
1979. Those who were not living with their parents at the time of the survey
were also excluded from the analysis.I also exclude respondents with missing
information on included observed characteristics such as family income, Armed
Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) scores, parental education, family stability
(whether the individual report having been raised within a nuclear family or
not), number of siblings, the area of residence (urban vs. rural), and ethnic
background. After imposing these restrictions, the sample consists of of 1,199
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white males, 625 black males, and 425 Hispanic males.
4.2 NLSY97
Similar to NLSY79, NLSY97 is also a nationally representative sample and
share many similarities with the earlier cohort. Precisely, it consists of a nation-
ally representative sample of 8,984 youths who were 12-16 years old as of late
December 1996. For both NLSY cohorts, there is detailed information on family
background and income as well as on individual scholastic ability (measured by
Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) scores). Interviews are ongoing for
both cohorts and are conducted on an annual or biannual basis. After imposing
similar restrictions on age as in NLSY79 and after removing those with missing
information on key variables, I ended up with a sample of 1,265 white males,
425 black males, and 373 Hispanic males.
4.3 Variable descriptions
4.3.1 Family income and AFQT scores
For both surveys, information on parental income was collected at multiple
interviews, and I use as much information as possible and create an average (over
time) of parental income.For instance, if income information is available for four
years (1978-1981), I use the average of those income measures. If income is only
available for one of the years, the average income is replaced by that income. I
29
chose this approach as it provides a measure closer to permanent income and it
also minimizes the number of individuals dropped because of missing income.
For both cohorts, I express income in the year 1997 dollars using the CPI for
all urban consumers.
Like the earlier literature on education using NLSY data, I use AFQT scores
to control for cognitive ability. The scores, available for both samples, are
adjusted to account for age diﬀerences at the time of the tests. Moreover, the
test scores for the 1997 cohort were adjusted to improve comparability with the
scores for the 1979 cohort, following Altonji et al. (2012).
4.3.2 Individual characteristic variables
Individual characteristic variables are reported in Table-1.
The variable, Number of siblings, is the number of brother and sister in
the individual's family. Individuals of all racial groups from NLSY79 cohort
have signiﬁcantly less sibling compared to their count parts from NLSY97. The
numbers of siblings of white individuals from NLSY79 is 2.76 that is by far less
than their black and Hispanic counterparts from the same cohort, which are
4.56 and 4.37, respectively. In NLSY97, the number of siblings of individuals
from all racial groups converged to around 2.5. The number of siblings of black
and Hispanic males decreased 78 percent and 74 percent respectively, while
white males' number sibling just reduced 22 percent. That may indicate the
opportunity cost of having more kids was increased dramatically from cohort
1979 compared to cohort 1997, especially for black and Hispanics families.
The variable, Intact family, is the proportion of males that who live in an
intact family. The proportion of males that who live in a complete family in
NLSY97 is dropped a lot compared to the ratio in NLSY79 for all racial groups
except Hispanics males. The proportion in NLSY79 are 83 percent and 58
percent for white and black males respectively and reduced to 69 percent and
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42 percent in NLSY97 which is the ratio of intact family decreased 22 percent
and 38 percent respectively. The proportion of an intact family only reduced 5
percent for Hispanic males.
The variable, South, is the proportion of males who that live in south region
states9. That is only a quart of white and Hispanics males live in the south
region states, and over half of the males living the south region states in NLSY79
and the ratios are similar in NLSY97, the ratios of live in south region states
are 26 percent , 64 percent and 31 percent for white, black and Hispanics males
respectively.
The variable, Rural, is the proportion of males who live in rural area. In
NLSY79, the proportion is 26 percent, 22 percent and 14 percent for white,
black and Hispanics males, respectively. In NLSY97, the ratio for white males
rise to 30 percent but both black and Hispanics males reduced to 21 percent
and 10 percent respectively. That shows white families moving from urban area
to rural area and black and Hispanics males moving from rural area to urban
area.
The variable, Father's education, is the average total schooling of individu-
als' father. In NLSY79, the average total schooling of white males' fathers is
12.55 years which is a bit above high school degree. The average total school-
ing for black and males' fathers is about 10.36 years and 8.61 years, which is
21 percent and 45 percent lesser than white males'. In NLSY97, the average
total schooling of father are all increased. White, black and Hispanics males'
verge total schooling of fathers increased to 13.78 years, 12.2 years and 10.76
respectively.
The variable, Mother's education, is the average total schooling of individu-
als' mother. In NLSY79, the average total schooling of white males' mothers is
9Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
NLSY79
White Black Hispanic
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Periods observed in panel 13.84 5.57 12.51 4.37 12.77 4.18
Number of siblings 2.76 1.76 4.56 2.96 4.37 2.79
Intact family 0.83 0.38 0.58 0.49 0.72 0.45
South 0.25 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.26 0.44
Rural 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.36 0.14 0.35
Father's education 12.55 3.19 10.36 3.27 8.61 4.68
Mother's education 12.14 2.29 11.05 2.49 8.26 4.32
Family income 66.92 33.82 28.04 17.51 42.15 23.49
Number of observations 1,199 625 418
NLSY97
White Black Hispanic
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Periods observed in panel 13.49 3.18 13.62 3.29 13.60 3.25
Number of siblings 2.26 1.04 2.55 1.35 2.51 1.14
Intact family 0.69 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.68 0.47
South 0.26 0.44 0.64 0.48 0.31 0.46
Rural 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.31
Father's education 13.78 2.83 12.2 2.32 10.76 3.73
Mother's education 13.69 2.44 12.60 2.09 11.08 3.41
Family income 99.63 70.94 36.39 38.96 58.78 45.59
Number of observations 1,265 425 373
Note: Family income is measured in $10,000 and expressed in 1997 U.S. dollars.
12.14 years which is a bit above high school degree. The average total schooling
for black and males' mothers are about 11.05 years and 8.26 years, which is less
than high school degree. In NLSY97 , the average total schooling of mother
are increased for all racial groups. White, black and Hispanics males' verge
total schooling of mothers increased to 13.69 years, 12.60 years and 11.08 re-
spectively. Compare to the average mothers' schooling in NLSY79, white, black
and Hispanics increased 12 percent, 14 percent and 34 percent respectively.
32
Table 2: Endogenous Variables
NLSY79
Variable Name White Black Hisp.
Mean Mean Mean
pre-gap schooling (years) 12.8 11.6 11.3
post-gap schooling (years) 2.4 1.7 2.4
pre-gap working (years) 9.3 7.8 8.5
post-gap working (years) 3.4 2.4 3.2
NEET (years) 1.6 3.9 1.9
gap (%) 36.5 35 38
gap_du (years) 1.4 1.6 1.5
NLSY97
Variable Name White Black Hisp.
Mean Mean Mean
pre-gap schooling (years) 13.4 12.4 12.5
post-gap schooling (years) 3.0 2.1 2.7
pre-gap working (years) 7.3 6.6 6.9
post-gap working (years) 3.7 2.1 3.2
NEET (years) 1.7 3.6 1.7
gap (%) 40 43 41




pre-gap schooling (years) 11.9 12.8
post-gap schooling (years) 2.1 2.6
pre-gap working (years) 8.5 6.9
post-gap working (years) 3.0 3.0
NEET (years) 2.5 2.3
gap (%) 36 41
gap_du (years) 1.5 1.5
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4.3.3 School enrollment and grade attainment
In both surveys, respondents are continuously asked about their current
school enrollment status, the highest grade they have attended (and completed),
as well as the dates they were last enrolled in school. The school enrollment
state variable I use, dsi;t, is constructed from the school enrollment and grade
attainment questions in time period t. Thus, dsi;t = 1 if the individual was
enrolled in school in period t and had an increment in his grade from period
t   1. If the individual was not enrolled or was enrolled but had no grade
increment, dsi;t = 0.
4.3.4 Accumulated schooling before and after an interruption
In my analysis, I need to separate educational attainment during diﬀerent
spells. Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne S1i;1 as the highest grade completed by individual i
in period t before any schooling interruption, while S2i;t measures the additional
grades completed in period t after a schooling interruption. Thus, S2i;1 equals
Si;t S1i;1 if the individual has experienced a schooling interruption by the time
period t, and equals 0 otherwise (in the case of no interruption).
To illustrate, assume the individual interrupted his schooling after complet-
ing grade 13 in period 3 and returns to school in period 5 and completes grade
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S1i;s = 13 for s = 4; :::; 30:
The values of S2i;1 will be as follows:
S2i;t = 0 for t = 1; :::; 4
S2i;5 = 1
S2i;6 = 2
S2i;t = 3 for t = 7; :::; 30:
The accumulated schooling in NLSY79, which are reported in Table-2, re-
ported that the white agents obtain 12.8 years of schooling in the pre-gap school-
ing period and around 2.4 years in the post-gap schooling period. Black agents
were obtained about 11.6 years in the pre-gap schooling and 1.7 years after
schooling. Hispanics agents were obtained only 11.3 years pre-gap schooling
but obtained 2.4 years post-gap schooling as the white agents.
From the table-2, The accumulated schooling in NLSY97 is report that all
racial groups obtained more schooling on the pre-gap schooling, all Hispanics
agents' pre-gap schooling is increased 1.2 years compared to its younger cohort.
The post-gap schooling is also increased for all racial groups. In general, the
post-gap schooling is increased 0.5 years in the cohort NLSY97 compare to
NLSY79 which is about 10 percent increase. The pre-gap schooling is increased
0.9 years in the cohort NLSY97 compared to the number in NLSY79 which is
about 20 percent increase.
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4.3.5 Not Enrolled, Employed or in Training (NEET)
In my model, an individual may choose not to enroll in school or work in any
given period. The indicator for this option is dneeti;t and the accumulated number
of periods in this state in period t is described by NEETi;t. In NLSY79, White
agents spend 1.6 years in NEET, Hispanics spend 1.9 years, and black agents
spend 3.9 years on NEET10. In NLSY97, the trend of NEET is similar to the
NLSY79 cohort.
4.3.6 Temporary interruptions to schooling
To identify individuals who have experienced schooling interruptions in pe-
riod t, I use the notation dgapi;t. The value of this variable changes from zero
to one in the period when the individual re-enrolls in school. From this point
forward it equals one, while it equals zero for all periods prior to re-enrollment.
For individuals who never re-enroll, dgapi;t = 08t. As showed in Table-2, among
white males, 36.5 percent had at least one school interruption in the 1979 co-
hort while the corresponding ﬁgure for the 1997 cohort is 40 percent. Thus,
the incidence of a school interruption for white males is virtually the same and
the ﬁgure for the older cohort is also very similar to that reported by Light
(1995). For black males, the proportion with an interruption was higher than
for any other group in the 1979 cohort (35 percent) but decreased to 43 percent
in the 1997 cohort, close to that for white males in the same cohort. Finally, for
Hispanics, the interruption rate is constant at close to 38 percent in NLSY79




Figure 1: Highest grade completed at the time of the ﬁrst school interruption
(white males in NLSY79)
In Figure 1, I illustrate the distribution of highest grade completed at the
time of a ﬁrst schooling interruption12. Not surprisingly, most of the inter-
ruptions (30 percent of all interruptions) occur after high school graduation
(grade 12). As discussed above, this school interruption between high school
and college is also the one that has attracted the most attention in the previous
literature. However, interruptions are also frequent during college years with
over 30 percent occurring after the completion of grades 13-15. Figures 2 and 3
show the distribution of highest grade completed at the time of a ﬁrst schooling
interruption for black and Hispanic males belonging to the 1979 cohort. As
can be seen, the timing of the interruptions is similar across the groups with a
signiﬁcant peak at grade 12. However, in all cases, the majority of interruptions
occur after completion of other grades.
12This ﬁgure is based on data for white males in NLSY79
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Figure 2: Highest grade completed at the time of ﬁrst schooling interruption
(black males in NLSY79)
In Figure 4, I present the distribution of the length or duration of school
interruptions for white males from the 1979 cohort. As can be seen, most
interruptions are short (11 percent of all individuals (or about a third of those
with an interruption) had an interruption of one year only. Long school gaps are
uncommon and, as expected, very few returns after gaps longer than 10 years.
Again, similar proﬁles and patterns are observed for black and Hispanic males
in the 1979 cohort.
4.3.7 Wages
Consistent with the previous literature on this topic, I use hourly wages as
my earnings measure to avoid contamination due to diﬀerences in working hours.
The natural logarithm of individual i 's hourly wage in period t, lnwi;t is the
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Figure 3: Highest grade completed at the time of ﬁrst schooling interruption
(Hisp. males in NLSY79)
Figure 4: Duration of the ﬁrst school interruption (white males in NLSY79)
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outcome variable in the wage function. To construct this variable, information
from questions about the individuals' hourly wages at their primary jobs are
used. For those who did not provide an hourly wage rate, this ﬁgure is computed
using their total annual earnings in period t divided by hours worked in that
period. Nominal hourly wages are adjusted to real terms using the Consumer
Price Index with 1997 as the reference year. Reported wages below the federal
minimum wage rate in any given time period were discarded.
4.3.8 Employment and work experience
Both NLSY surveys provide detailed information on respondents' work his-
tory. Employment on a week-by-week basis is available from the work history
ﬁles from the initial survey up to and including 2012. The employment variable
dei;t is deﬁned based on the individual's work status and working hours. Specif-
ically, dei;t = 1 if individual i worked during period t and was not enrolled in
school. Work experience Ei;t is the accumulation of employment states as of
period t.
4.3.9 Work experience between ﬁrst and second schooling spell
The wage function in my model is very general and I separate work experi-
ence before and after an interruption in order to allow for diﬀerent wage growth
for those with and without an interruption. Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne E1i;t as the
work experience acquired between the ﬁrst and the second schooling spell. This
begins to accumulate after the individual starts working. For those who never
return to school, E1i;t equals Ei;t. For those who do interrupt, E1i;t equals Ei;t
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during the ﬁrst working spell and E1i;t = E1i;t 1 after the completion of the
ﬁrst working spell.
4.3.10 Work experience after second schooling spell
For those who return to school, I deﬁne E2i;t as the work experience accu-
mulated starting after the completion of the second schooling spell. Speciﬁcally,
E2i;t = Ei;t E1i;t if the person has had an interruption in period t, and E2i;t = 0
otherwise. For example, assume that an individual interrupts his schooling af-
ter completing grade 13 in period 3, returns to school in period 5, completes
grade 16 in period 7, and then works for the remaining time periods. In this
case, E1i;t = E1i;2 = E1i;3 = 0 and from period 4 to 30, it will take on the
value one, that is E1i;4 = 1; :::; E1i;30 = 1. The variable representing experi-
ence accumulated after an interruption will evolve as follows in this example:
E2i;1 = ::: = E2i;7 = 0 and from period 8 onwards, E2i;t=t 7;:::;30 .
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5 Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated using maximum likelihood tech-
niques where the likelihood contribution for a given individual consists of the





density function of log-wages (f (wi;t)), derived using the distribution assump-
tion of the wage shocks. The permanent unobserved heterogeneity terms are
integrated out from the conditional probabilities and the overall, unconditional








dki;t = 1jtype = m

f (wi;t)
Ii;t(w>wmin) Pr (type = m) ;
(22)
where Ti denotes the number of time periods individual i is observed in the
data and Ii;t (w > wmin) is an indicator function that equals one if a wage is
observed (above the minimum wage) in period t, and zero otherwise.
5.1 Identiﬁcation
The model parameters are identiﬁed from the distributional assumptions
made on the utility and wage shocks and from data on choices and wages in
each period. The discount rate is set to 0.95, consistent with the norm in the
literature. The parameters in the utility of attending school are also identiﬁed
from data on the socioeconomic status of the individual, while information on
initial education help to identify the type probabilities. In this paper, individuals
are observed making diﬀerent choices because they diﬀer in types.
I use the highest level of education obtained by individual's mother and fa-
ther and other personal characters to help explain the choice of schooling and
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the degree of education to help explain employment outcomes. The parameters
of the wage equation are identiﬁed by agents' work experience and schooling
choices, including the decisions to interrupt education. I also assume that in-
dividuals' s type is one of the facts that that aﬀects their wages which allow




In this section, only selected estimates of interest will be discussed. All
parameter estimates and their asymptotic standard errors for all racial groups
and both cohorts appear in Tables 10 to 32 in the Appendix. Before discussing
selected parameter estimates, I describe how I select the appropriate number of
types used to approximate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Follow-
ing this, the results for white males from the 1979 cohort with 30 observation
periods will be discussed. This discussion will be followed by presentations and
comparisons of results for white, black and Hispanic males from both cohorts
(using 17 periods of data in both NLSY79 and NLSY97). Lastly, I compare my
results to those in Light (1995).
6.1 Selection of the number of types
In my model, to control for general serial correlation and make the dynamic
model computational feasible, I assumed that individuals could be distinguished
to M types whereM is determined by comparing two diﬀerent, likelihood-based
information criteria - the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC are both common statistics in studies
that need to discriminate between diﬀerent model alternatives. In Table 2 and
Figures 5 and 6, I show the AIC, 13 BIC14 scores as well as the computational
time as a result of diﬀerent assumptions regarding the number of types.
As can be seen, both AIC and BIC are minimized for the 4-type model.
Consequently, the results in this thesis are based on the 4-type model. The
13AIC=2 (number of estimated parameters in the model) + 2 (number of observations)L
14BIC= (number of estimated parameters in the model) (log of number of observation) +
2 (number of observations)L
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Table 3: AIC and BIC Scores of diﬀerent models
Models no-type 2-type 3-type 4-type 5-type
AIC 20527.51 19673.64 19269.73 19094.47 19107.65
1AIC - -4.16 -2.05 -0.91 0.07
BIC 20781.85 19953.41 19574.93 19425.11 19463.72
1BIC - -3.99 -1.90 -0.77 0.20
Time 20hrs 36hrs 52hrs 64hrs 82hrs
Figure 5: AIC and BIC Scores
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Figure 6: 4AIC and 4BIC Scores
computational times described in Table 1 refers to the model estimated on white
males from the 1979 cohort where choices can be made for up to 30 periods.
This long time horizon signiﬁcantly impacts computational time, in addition
to the incorporation of discretely distributed unobserved heterogeneity. Adding
four types, compared to the speciﬁcation that is based on a single, common type
increases time till convergence with 44 hours.
6.2 Model ﬁt
Model ﬁt study is important in structural modeling. In this paper, I proved
the model-ﬁt study to the data of all racial groups in all cohorts. The result of
all model ﬁts of all data sets are provide in the appendix 15. I conducted six
15ﬁgure 13 to ﬁgure 55
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separate model-ﬁt studies on six diﬀerent data sets: white males (NLSY79),
black males (NLSY79), Hispanics males (NLSY79), white males (NLSY97),
black males (NLSY97) and Hispanic males (NLSY97). I compare and study
endogenous variables from the generated data16 to the observed data: 1) The
incident of pre-gap schooling; 2) the incidence of the post-gap schooling; 3) the
incidence of the pre-gap working status; 4) the incidence of the post-gap working
status; 5) the incidence of being NEET; 6) the rate of schooling interruption;
and 7) the wage path. The result shows the model ﬁts most of the data sets
properly.
6.3 Results for White Males from the 1979 Cohort
6.3.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
As mentioned above, I assume that the portion of the unobserved hetero-
geneity that is time-invariant is orthogonal to initial schooling, and as described
above, discretely distributed with four support points.
Using the estimated parameters associated with the type probabilities and
Bayes's rule, each has been allocated into one of the four groups. Selected details
and features of the four types are shown in Table 4. From this table, we can see
that type three is the most common type representing 62 percent of the sample,
while type two is the least frequent one, with only ﬁve percent of the sample.
Further, the estimated utility and wage parameters that are type speciﬁc
diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the four types with type two being the category with
the lowest utility of both school and work, followed by type four. The incidence
16Generated by my structural model.
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Table 4: Distribution of Type-Speciﬁc Heterogeneity (white males in NLSY79)
Type 1 2 3 4
sm 6:7 1:7 7:0 2:8
em 4:1  1:8 4:3 0:5
wm 2:1 2:0 1:6 1:8
gap% 29:8 33:3 31:3 46:4
Cognitive(score) 0:17  0:2  0:04 0:05
Freq:% 13 5 62 20
of a schooling interruption or a gap also varies across the types and is highest
for type four individuals (over 46 percent) and lowest among type one males
(those with the highest cognitive skills). 17
Since it is a non-linear model, the magnitude of coeﬃcients of some param-
eters are diﬃcult to interpret, and I will illustrate the impact of certain policies
in counterfactual simulations below. Nevertheless, the signs of the estimates are
interpretable and of interest, and a brief discussion will be devoted to this.
6.3.2 Parameters of the utility of schooling
After controlling for the unobservable terms, the coeﬃcients associated with






ds4, are  1:9122,  0:5961,  0:7583 and
0:8403; respectively. All the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative suggesting
that white males' utility of schooling is the lowest when they ﬁrst enroll in a
postsecondary education institution. The utility of schooling is decreasing as
the schooling increase18. The coeﬃcient for enrolled in a graduate program is
lower than the coeﬃcients for enrolled in a four-year university program or a
two-year university/college program.
17The cognitive skills measure is standardized with mean zero and variance equal to one.
18Expect if the person is enrolled in high school
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The coeﬃcient of parental income shomeincome is 0:0036 and it is signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients for parental educations shgcf and 
s
hgcm are 0:0577 and 0:0575,
respectively and signiﬁcant. It indicates that both parents' education plays an
equally important role in individual's utility of schooling. The coeﬃcient of
living in a nuclear family snuclear is 0:2647, and the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant. It
conﬁrms ﬁndings in other studies and suggests family stability play an important
role in educational outcomes. The coeﬃcient on siblings snsib is 0:0505 and
is also signiﬁcant. It also conﬁrms previous patterns where a negative associa-
tion between family size and education has been identiﬁed. From an economic
perspective, this suggests that families with many children have fewer resources
to devote to each child's education. The coeﬃcient of the duration of the in-
terruption to schooling sgapdur is 0:0541, and it is signiﬁcant. It suggests that
students will be more likely to return to school the longer the duration of the
schooling interruption. The the coeﬃcient of return to school indicator sIt 1 is
 2:2025 and it is signiﬁcant. It suggests that if a white male is not in school at
the last period, then he is less likely to choose to go to school the current term.
The coeﬃcients of living in a southern state and living in a rural area are not
signiﬁcant factors related to the utility of schooling.
6.3.3 Parameters of the utility of working
The coeﬃcients of education, eeudc and work experience, 
e
exp are 0:3053
and 0:2037, respectively and they are both signiﬁcant. These suggest, not very
surprisingly that the probability of working improves with the level of education
and past work experience.
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6.3.4 Parameters of the wage function
As mentioned above, the wage function is speciﬁed in a very general way in
order to allow for diﬀerent returns to education depending on how the education
was acquired and the highest level that was achieved. It also needs to allow for
diﬀerent growth rate post-graduation or after completion of education. As such,
the speciﬁcation used in this thesis diﬀers from the more traditional, Mincer-
type regressions that are common in labor economics. It also means that the
coeﬃcients are not as straightforward to interpret. Consequently, in this section,
I will present the main estimates and comment on their signiﬁcance and general
eﬀect but refer more reﬁned analysis of the wage eﬀect of school interruptions
for example to the section on simulations below.





ws14 , are 0:1340, 0:1890, 0:5049 and 0:7357, respectively. All of them are sig-
niﬁcant, positive and increasing as the schooling levels increase suggesting that
increases in pre-gap education levels signiﬁcantly increase entry wages and there
is evidence of so-called sheep-skin eﬀects as the estimates suggest discrete in-
creases when certain grade levels have been completed.
In terms of work experience, the variables measuring experience before and
after an interruption enter the wage equation both in levels as well as squared
(to allow for the wage-experience proﬁles to be concave). Each of them is also
interacted with education before and after a school gap, diﬀerentiated by the
highest level completed. Starting with the level variables (we1 and 
w
e2), the
estimates are 0:0492 and 0:0538, respectively and both are highly signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients of the squared terms of these experience variables, we12 and 
w
e22
are 0:0011 and  0:0014, both negative and signiﬁcant, which shows that both
experience proﬁles are concave.
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The estimated interaction terms are very interesting. The interaction be-







are all positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that wages grow faster with work
experience for those with more pre-gap schooling. However, the interaction





e1s24 are all negative and signiﬁcant. That indicates that there is
no complementarity between work experience gained during the schooling inter-
ruption and subsequent education. The ﬁnal interaction term between post-gap







are all positive but we2s21 are 
w
e2s22 are not signiﬁcant. Thus, as expected wage
growth are higher for those with more education but it is lower for the returners
than for the non-returners.
6.4 Results for White Males from the 1979 and 1997 Co-
horts
As mentioned above, I only observe respondents for up to 17 years in NLSY97
and to be consistent; I compare the NLSY97 results with results from using only
the ﬁrst 17 years of the NLSY79.
6.4.1 Parameters of the utility of schooling
As expected, all of the coeﬃcients associated with the grade level are nega-
tive, with the exception of the coeﬃcient of enrolled in high school in NLSY97,
and they are all signiﬁcant in NLSY97 but not in NLSY79, where only the ﬁrst
estimate that is associated with completing high school is signiﬁcant. There are
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some interesting diﬀerences between the two cohorts. For instance, the coef-
ﬁcient of enrolled in a graduate program is about 2.25 times19 lower than the
coeﬃcient of enrolled in an undergrad program in the 1997 cohort. For the
1979 cohort, the diﬀerence is only about 1.13 times20. It may indicate greater
costs with higher education for those in the younger cohort, something that is
consistent with the increases in direct costs observed over the last few decades.
A similar diﬀerence exists for lower levels of post-secondary education.
For both cohorts, the coeﬃcients of parental income, parental education and
the eﬀect of living in a nuclear family are strongly positively related to the
utility of schooling. Also for both cohorts, the coeﬃcient for the number of
siblings, the eﬀect of the return to school indicator, are strongly signiﬁcant and
negatively related to the schooling utility. Living in a southern state and living
in a rural area are not signiﬁcant factors related to the utility of schooling.
The estimated eﬀects of cognitive ability on the utility of enrolling in school
are, as expected, positive and signiﬁcant for both cohorts. However, and consis-
tent with recent and emerging work on comparative analyses between NLSY79
and NLSY97, the impact appears to be more substantial for the 1979 cohort
(0.5860 compared to 0.3774 for the 1997 cohort).21 Although it is not possible
to directly associate and compare these two estimates, the diﬀerence in mag-
nitudes suggests a decline in the importance of cognitive skills in educational
decisions. Part of this reduced eﬀect may be due to improved access to higher
education in more recent years.
6.4.2 Parameters of the utility of working
19-3.12869 vs. -1.3869
20-0.4315 vs. -0.3755
21See for instance Castex and Dechter (2014) for an in-depth analysis of the changing roles
of ability in explaining wage distributions.
52
The coeﬃcients of educational level and work experience are signiﬁcantly and
positively related to the utility of working. The coeﬃcient of working experience
is about 2.8 times larger than the coeﬃcient of schooling for the 1997 cohort,
while the same ratio is about 1.2 for the 1979 cohort. It indicates, in the 1997
cohort, that each additional year of work experience will provide 2.8 times more
utility units to working than each additional year of schooling. Hence the agent
with more working experience will be more likely to choose to keep working
instead of choosing study or consume NEET (i.e., chose NEET).
On the other hand, for the cohort of 1979, each additional year of working
experience will provide about the same utility units to working as each additional
year of schooling. Hence, for agents in the 1979 cohort, the decision to work is
not as sensitive to prior working experience (or as persistent) as it is for agents
in the younger cohort.
6.4.3 Parameters of the wage function
After controlling for unobserved ability, the coeﬃcients of pre-gap schooling






s14) are 0:0982, 0:1858, 0:4209
and 0:6114, respectively. Compared to the longer version of the same cohort
(shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 12), these estimates are lower, especially at
higher levels of education. This clearly illustrates the importance of incorporat-
ing wage data from much of the life-cycle when estimating the returns to higher
education and that the focus or usage (intended or unintended) of short-term
data may seriously underestimate the economic beneﬁts of higher education (as
the beneﬁts of these educational outcomes take longer to materialize).
For the younger cohort, the corresponding coeﬃcients of pre-gap schooling
levels display a similar, increasing pattern ( 0:0496, 0:0162, 0:1140 and 0:3372,
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respectively) but the magnitudes are signiﬁcantly lower at each level. The nega-
tive estimate for high school level of pre-gap schooling must be interpreted in its
proper context where the variable is also interacted with work experience. Thus,
it is not necessarily suggesting that there is a negative return to graduating from
high school.







 0:0246, 0:0519, 0:1164, and 0:1031 for the 1979 cohort and
0:1558, 0:0314, 0:0632, and 0:0696 for the 1997 cohort. Two out four (ws23
and ws24) are signiﬁcant for the 1979 cohort while the last three are signiﬁcant for
the 1997 cohort. This pattern may, in part, be due to the timing of interruptions
with relatively few students returning after having stopped schooling before high
school graduation.
When compared to the estimates for pre-gap schooling discussed above,
the magnitudes of the post-gap schooling are substantially lower, especially for
higher levels of education. For instance, the estimates of ws13 and 
w
s14 (0:4209
and 0:6114, respectively, are between six and nine time larger than the corre-
sponding estimates for post-gap schooling. This indicates that the return to
education acquired after an interruption is signiﬁcantly lower than the corre-
sponding return is education is acquired continuously. However, there are still
some modest wage gains associated with improvements in education. It should
also be noted that both pre- and post-gap education are interacted with work
experience which needs to be considered. As mentioned above, a more com-
plete and comprehensive assessment of the impact on life-cycle income from an
educational interruption will be presented below.
The estimates for work experience (when not interacted with education) are
0:0771 and 0:0983 for pre-gap experience for the 1979 and 1997 cohorts, re-
spectively. For post-gap experience, the estimates are 0:0808 and 0:0997. The
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coeﬃcients of the squared terms of these experience variables are  0:0029 and
 0:0043 for pre-gap experience and  0:0047 and  0:0028 for post-gap experi-
ence. The ﬁrst numbers in each set refer to the 1979 cohort while the second
numbers are for the 1997 cohort. These are all statistically signiﬁcant and show
that the experience proﬁles are concave in both cohorts.
For NLSY79, the interaction terms between pre-gap schooling and work
experience, we1s11and 
w





tive and signiﬁcant. This means that wages grow faster with work experience
for those with more pre-gap schooling in 4-year university or graduate school
while is not the case for lower levels of pre-gap schooling (high school or 2-
year college). The interaction terms of pre-gap work experience and post-gap







and 0:0355. The signs of these are the same as those discussed above and in-
dicate that there is no complementarity between work experience gained during
the schooling interruption and subsequent education.
The ﬁrst two interaction term between post-gap work experience and post-
gap educational levels, we2s21and 
w
e2s22 are positive and signiﬁcant (0:0270 and
0:0225) but the last two, we2s21 and 
w
e2s22 are not signiﬁcant. This indicates
that wages grow faster with work experience for those who return to complete
high-school or a two-year college degree but not necessarily for those who return
to complete a higher degree. This ﬁnding, combined with the result above
where those who return and complete a higher degree do realize a (statistically)
signiﬁcant return, show that there is an immediate reward to return to school
but that reward does not grow over time and with experience.
For NLSY97, the corresponding interaction terms between pre-gap schooling
and work experience show a similar pattern with one exception. First, like the
1979 results, the ﬁrst interaction (for high school) we1s11 is not signiﬁcant but
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e1s14 are both positive and signiﬁcant. Like before,
wages grow faster with work experience for those with more pre-gap schooling
and more so for the 1997 cohort than for the 1979 cohort.







e1s24 are 0:0185, 0:0308,  0:0184 and 0:0196.
Similar to the 1979 results, these indicate that there is no complementarity be-
tween work experience gained during the schooling interruption and subsequent
education. Finally, and in contrast to the result from NLSY79, the ﬁnal interac-







e2s22 are all signiﬁcant and negative. Taken outside
their context, this indicates that for the 1997 cohort, wages decrease with work
experience for those with more post-gap schooling. This counter-intuitive result
may however depend on the estimates of the other variables involving post-gap
human capital and I will show below that wages grow with experience also for
those who return to school.
6.5 Black males from NLSY79 and NLSY97 with 17 peri-
ods of observations
The results in this section were obtained utilizing information on black re-
spondents from both the original sample and from the over-sample of black
respondents in both cohorts. Despite including the over-sample, the number
of respondents is somewhat low (625 for the 1979 cohort and 425 for the 1997
cohort). Nevertheless, I believe it is important to estimate the parameters sep-
arately for each racial group in order to allow them to diﬀer across groups.
Similar to the presentation above, I will ﬁrst present the estimates for the util-
ity of school, followed by the utility of employment, wage function and ﬁnally,
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the estimates associated with cognitive scores.
6.5.1 Parameters of the utility of schooling





ds4 are  1:4791, 0:9658, 1:0504 and  1:1734, respectively All these
estimates are signiﬁcant. For the 1997 cohort, the coeﬃcients associated with
the same grade levels are also all negative but the magnitudes are lower in each
case:  1:1545, 0:2459, 0:1173 and  0:5885, respectively. However, for the
younger cohort, the estimates are not signiﬁcant, with the exception of the ﬁrst
one that relates to high school.
To the extent that these estimates are capturing costs of attending a cer-
tain grade level and progressing through the educational system, the diﬀerence
in estimates across the two cohorts suggests that the cost was higher in the
1980s (when the respondents of the 1979 cohort attended senior high school and
college) than in the ﬁrst decade of the new millenia.
When comparing these results with the corresponding ones for white males,
we note that the pattern is opposite for the two groups. While education appears
to have become less costly (or more accessible) for blacks over time, the contrary
is true for whites where these estimates where relatively small and not signiﬁcant
for the 1979 cohort but large, negative and signiﬁcant for the 1997 cohort.
A further indication that there has been a shift or change in the cost of
and access to higher education for black males is the coeﬃcient of parental
income shomeincome which is 0:2102 and signiﬁcant in NLSY79 and 0:0908 and
not signiﬁcant in NLSY97. Thus, the relationship between family income and
educational attainment is weaker for the younger cohort. This is also a result
that contrasts that reported for whites above.
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The coeﬃcients associated with parental education shgcf and 
s
hgcm are
0:0090 and 0:0812 for NLSY79 and 0:0631 and 0:0845, respectively for the
NLSY97. With the exception of the coeﬃcient for father's schooling in NLSY79,
these are all signiﬁcant and comparable to those reported above for whites. The
coeﬃcient of living in a nuclear family snuclear is 0:0452 for the NLSY79 and
0:2377 for the NLSY97. The estimate is signiﬁcant for the cohort in 1997 but
not for the cohort in 1979 and suggests that family stability has become much
more important for educational success and attainment than before. The mag-
nitude of the estimate for NLSY97 is similar to that for white males of the same
cohort (0:28).
The coeﬃcient for number of siblings snsib is 0:0064 in NLSY79 and 0:0652
in NLSY97. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant for the 1997 cohort but not for the
1979 cohort. The negative association between family size and educational at-
tainment may be due to lack of ﬁnancial resources as the cost increases with
family size. However, as discussed above, I have included measures of family
income in the utility of school and this is arguably a better measure of ﬁnancial
resources of the household and its economic ability to support their children
through school, suggesting that other factors may be at play in driving the
change in the estimate for number of siblings.
Finally, the coeﬃcient of return to school indicator sIt 1 is 3:1655 in NLSY79
and  3:1057 in NLSY97. The coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant in both co-
horts and larger in absolute terms than for whites. These suggest that, in both
cohorts, black males are less likely to choose to go to school if they were not in
school at the previous period. The coeﬃcient of living in a southern state or in
a rural area are not signiﬁcant factors related to the utility of schooling.
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6.5.2 Parameters of the utility of working
The coeﬃcients for education and work experience, eeduc and 
e
exp are 0:2958
and 0:3628 in the NLSY79 and 0:1117 and 0:2881 in the NLSY97. All the coeﬃ-
cient are signiﬁcantly and positively related to the utility of working. Similar to
the ratio for white males, the coeﬃcient for work experience is about 2.5 times
larger than the coeﬃcient for schooling for the 1997 cohort while the ratio is
about 1.2 for the 1979 cohort. This indicates that, similar to their white coun-
terparts in the NLSY97, additional work experience will provide 2.5 times units
of work utility than additional schooling. Also, for the results for NLSY79,
the estimated experience-education ratio in utility gains is similar to the one
estimated for their white counterparts in NLSY79.
6.5.3 Parameters of the wage function







0:0406, 0:6781, 0:1134 and 0:1235; respectively in NLSY79. All of the coeﬃcients
of pre-gap schooling levels are signiﬁcant. The corresponding coeﬃcients for
NLSY97 are 0:0605, 0:5153, 0:1131 and 0:2341, respectively and they are also
signiﬁcant.
The pattern with a peak for the completion of a two-year college and then
lower returns for higher education is diﬀers from what was observed for white
males where the return increased gradually with completed education, which
is the case for black males except for the large estimate for a two-year college.
Aside from that estimate, there a gradual but small increase and although the
magnitudes are higher for the 1997 cohort, at least for the ﬁrst and last coeﬃ-
cients (high school and graduate school, respectively), they are much below the
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corresponding ones for white males (again, with the exception of the estimate
for a two-year college degree).







0:0131, 0:0122, 0:0431, and 0:0145, respectively in NLSY79. For the NLSY97,
the coeﬃcients are 0:0567, 0:0256, 0:0561, and 0:0231; respectively. With the
exception of the estimate for high school in NLSY97, they are all signiﬁcant.
These estimates are somewhat lower the those for white males but still sug-
gest a positive wage impact of returning to school and complete a higher degree.
For example, ignoring for the moment the interaction terms of post-gap school-
ing and other work experience, returning to complete a four-year college degree
in NLSY79 increases the wage with over 4 percent. For NLSY97, that number
is even higher (around 5.5 percent) and similar to that of returning to complete
high school. However, and as was documented for white males, the returns
to post-gap education are lower than those to pre-gap education. This will be
further illustrated using model simulations below.
The estimates for work experience (when not interacted with education)
are 0:0163 and 0:0528 for pre-gap experience for the 1979 and 1997 cohorts,
respectively. For post-gap experience, the estimates are 0:0141 and 0:0461. In
all cases, these estimates are signiﬁcantly below those obtained for white males
above. The coeﬃcients of the squared terms of these experience variables are
 0:0003 and  0:0027 for pre-gap experience and  0:0004 and  0:002 for post-
gap experience. The ﬁrst numbers in each set refer to the 1979 cohort while
the second numbers are for the 1997 cohort. The estimates associated with pre-
gap experience are both statistically signiﬁcant and show that the experience
proﬁles are concave in both cohorts. For post-gap experience, the estimates are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
For NLSY79, the interaction terms between pre-gap schooling and work ex-
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e1s14 are all positive and signiﬁcant. This
means that wages grow faster with work experience for those with more pre-
gap schooling. The interaction terms of pre-gap work experience and post-






e1s24 are 0:023, 0:001, 0:114
and 0:0145 for NLSY79 and 0:0185, 0:0031,  0:1123 and 0:0112 for NLSY97.
The estimates for NLSY79 are generally not signiﬁcant while they are for NLSY97
which, like the results for white males, indicate that there is no complementarity
between work experience gained during the schooling interruption and subse-
quent education.
For NLSY79, the interaction terms between post-gap work experience and






e2s24 are all signiﬁcant
( 0:0003, 0:0012, 0:1124 and 0:0781). These estimates suggest a slightly smaller
wage growth for those who return to complete high school and a substantially
greater wage growth for those returning to complete a 4-year college degree as
well as for those returning to school in order to get a graduate degree. This
pattern is also observed for NLSY97, although the magnitudes of the estimates
are lower, closer to zero and with only one exception, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Those who return to school at grade levels above 16 see a signiﬁcant
wage gain, like the 1979 cohort, but almost half the size of that group. Fur-
ther, this ﬁnding, combined with the result above where those who return and
complete a higher degree do realize a (statistically) signiﬁcant return, show that
there is an immediate reward to return to school for the 1997 cohort but that
reward does not grow over time and with experience
6.6 Hispanic males from NLSY79 and NLSY97 with 17
periods of observations
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The results in this section were obtained utilizing information on Hispanic
respondents from both the original sample and from the over-sample of Hispanic
respondents in both cohorts. Despite including the over-sample, the number of
respondents is somewhat low (425 for the 1979 cohort and 373 for the 1997
cohort). Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, it is important to estimate the
parameters separately for each racial group in order to allow them to diﬀer across
groups. Similar to the presentation above, I will ﬁrst present the estimates for
the utility of school, followed by the utility of employment, wage function and
ﬁnally, the estimates associated with cognitive scores.
6.6.1 Parameters of the utility of schooling





ds4 are  0:2290, 0:9255, 1:0648 and  1:4581, respectively. Except
for the ﬁrst estimate, these estimates are signiﬁcant. For the 1997 cohort, the
coeﬃcients associated with the same grade levels are also all negative but the
magnitudes are lower for higher levels of education:  1:0831, 0:4857, 0:4991
and  0:7015, respectively. For the younger cohort, the estimates are signiﬁcant,
with the exception of the third one that relates to 4-year college.
As for the results for black males just discussed, the diﬀerence in estimates
across the two cohorts suggests that the cost was higher in the 1980s (when the
respondents of the 1979 cohort attended senior high school and college) than in
the ﬁrst decade of the new millenia.
Also consistent with the results for black males, the coeﬃcient of parental
income shomeincome is larger in NLSY79 than in NLSY97, providing further
evidence that there has been a shift or change in the cost of, and access to,
higher education for non-white males. The estimate is 0:1059 in NLSY79 and
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0:0476 in NLSY97. Both are signiﬁcant. Thus, the relationship between family
income and educational attainment is weaker for the younger cohort in contrast
to the results for whites above.
The coeﬃcients associated with parental education shgcf and 
s
hgcm are
0:0052 and  0:017 for NLSY79 and 0:0316 and 0:0152, respectively for the
NLSY97. With the exception of the coeﬃcient for father's schooling in NLSY97,
none of these are signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of living in a nuclear family snuclear
is 0:2647 for the NLSY79 and 0:2617 for the NLSY97. The estimates are sig-
niﬁcant for both cohorts and comparable to those for white males, suggesting
that family stability is important for educational attainment. The coeﬃcient
for number of siblings snsib is 0:0325 in NLSY79 and  0:0261 in NLSY97 but
none of them are signiﬁcant.
Finally, the coeﬃcient of return to school indicator sIt 1 is  2:888 in NLSY79
and  2:698 in NLSY97. The coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant in both
cohorts and similar to those for whites and blacks presented above.
6.6.2 Parameters of the utility of working
The coeﬃcients for education and work experience, eeduc and 
e
exp are 0:3029
and 0:275 in the NLSY79 and 0:0634 and 0:2791 in the NLSY97. All the coef-
ﬁcient are signiﬁcantly and positively related to the utility of working. Similar
to the ratio for black and white males, the coeﬃcient for work experience is
substantially larger than the coeﬃcient for schooling for the 1997 cohort while
the ratio is close to one for the 1979 cohort. This indicates that, similar to
their black and white counterparts in the NLSY97, additional work experience
will provide more units of work utility than additional schooling. Also, for the
results for NLSY79, the estimated experience-education ratio in utility gains is
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similar to the one estimated for their white counterparts in NLSY79.
6.6.3 Parameters of the wage function







 0:0428, 0:2341, 0:3211 and 0:6435; respectively in NLSY79. All of the coeﬃ-
cients of pre-gap schooling levels are signiﬁcant. The corresponding coeﬃcients
for NLSY97 are  0:0526, 0:2333, 0:2414 and 0:7675, respectively and they are
also signiﬁcant. The pattern with gradually increasing returns is similar to the
one observed for white males but the magnitude of the estimates are a bit higher
for Hispanics.







0:0121, 0:0134, 0:1213, and 0:1723, respectively in NLSY79. For the NLSY97,
the coeﬃcients are  0:1231, 0:0144, 0:234, and 0:2321, respectively. With the
exception of the estimate for high school in NLSY79, they are all signiﬁcant.
These estimates are higher than the those for white males and suggest a
positive wage impact of returning to school and complete a higher degree, es-
pecially at higher levels (4-year college and above). For example, ignoring for
the moment the interaction terms of post-gap schooling and other work experi-
ence, returning to complete a four-year college degree in NLSY79 increases the
wage with over 12 percent. For NLSY97, that number is even higher (over 23
percent). However, and as was documented for the other groups, the returns
to post-gap education are lower than those to pre-gap education. This will be
further illustrated using model simulations below.
The estimates for work experience (when not interacted with education)
are 0:0236 and 0:0684 for pre-gap experience for the 1979 and 1997 cohorts,
respectively. For post-gap experience, the estimates are 0:0658 and 0:0943. In
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all cases, these estimates are signiﬁcantly above those obtained for black males
above. The coeﬃcients of the squared terms of these experience variables are
 0:0023 and  0:0042 for pre-gap experience and  0:0028 and  0:003 for post-
gap experience. The ﬁrst numbers in each set refer to the 1979 cohort while
the second numbers are for the 1997 cohort. The estimates associated with pre-
gap experience are both statistically signiﬁcant and show that the experience
proﬁles are concave in both cohorts. For post-gap experience, the estimates are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
For NLSY79, the interaction terms between pre-gap schooling and work






e1s14 are all signiﬁcant and increasing with
education. This means that wages grow faster with work experience for those
with more pre-gap schooling. Similar results, but with slightly larger eﬀects at
each level, are observed for NLSY97. The interaction terms of pre-gap work







 0:0241, 0:0453, 0:0121 and 0:0247 for NLSY79 and  0:0191, 0:0245, 0:0133 and
0:0144 for NLSY97. Two of the four estimates for NLSY79 are signiﬁcant while
all the NLSY97 estimates are signiﬁcant. Unlike the results for black and white
males, there is complementarity between work experience gained during the
schooling interruption and subsequent education for some levels of education,
primarily for higher degrees.
For NLSY79, the interaction terms between post-gap work experience and






e2s24 are not signiﬁcant
(0:0036, 0:0038, 0:1163 and 0:1356), except for the one corresponding to 4-year
college. That estimate, 0:1163; suggests a larger wage growth for those who
return to complete a 4-year college degree. This pattern is also observed for
NLSY97, although the magnitudes of the estimates are a bit lower.
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7 Counterfactual Policy Simulations
As mentioned already, the estimates of the model are not always directly
interpretable and to complement the discussion in the Results section above, I
will use the model and the estimated parameters to simulate outcomes under
diﬀerent assumptions in order to illustrate more clearly the eﬀects of interrupting
schooling. Speciﬁcally, I consider three diﬀerent scenarios to illustrate changes
in wages and lifetime income across educational levels, with and without a
schooling interruption.
In the ﬁrst scenario, agents are forced to ﬁnish high school but are not allowed
to continue investing beyond this level. Following high school graduation, they
are allowed to optimize over the work and home options until they reach age
45 (when I use data on white males from the 30 periods of NLSY79) or age 32
(when I use data on all racial groups and for both NLSY79 and NLSY97). In
the former case, I consider discounted, lifetime (until age 45) income while in
the latter case, I use hourly wages instead since I only observe them until age
32.
In the second scenario, agents are forced to ﬁnish a university degree before
they have to leave school and, again, are not allowed to re-enrolled in school.
As in the ﬁrst scenario, they are allowed to optimally choose work or home time
from graduation until ages 32 or 45. Finally, in the third scenario, agents are
also forced to have a university degree before they can permanently leave school,
but are also forced to take a gap year between high school and university, a year
during which they are assumed to be working. The rationale for this simulation
exercise is to illustrate both the economic beneﬁts with a university degree
relative to a high school diploma as well as showing the impact a gap year may
have on the estimated university return.
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I will also use the model to show expected impacts of a hypothetical policy
that provides ﬁnancial support to families if the respondent enrolls in college. In
this analysis, I increase the family income of agents taking college-level education
by diﬀerent amounts from $3,500 per year up to $30,000 per year. Such a
subsidy may both increase and decrease the incidence of school interruptions.
For example, the subsidy may make college more attractive to students who
decided to leave school after graduating from high school, that is improving
the re-enrollment rates and the proportion of students who interrupt school. It
may also provide the means for students who take a gap year to save money for
college, thereby decreasing the incidence of interruptions.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. I the next subsection, I will
discuss results for white males from the long (30 periods) NLSY79 data. This
is followed by a presentation of diﬀerences in returns and impacts across racial
groups and over time. The following subsection will illustrate heterogeneity in
returns and the eﬀect of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when estimating
the model. Finally, this section ends with an analysis of the policy simulation
described above.
7.1 White Males from the long NLSY79
7.1.1 Simulated discounted lifetime income
The reason why I devote an entire subsection to the analysis of white males
from the 30 period (long) NLSY79 is that some, perhaps most, of the beneﬁts
to re-enroll in education will only materialize later on their careers and access to
panel data over a long horizon is required. For the shorter (17 periods) panels,
students who go to a 4-year college do not have enough time to recover the lost
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Table 5: Simulated discounted, lifetime income (in 1997 U.S. dollars)
NLSY White Agents
Income
Proportion High School College - no gap College - gap
Type 1 16% $404,465 $458,989 $411,260
Type 2 5% $234,420 $265,738 $260,083
Type 3 60% $239,585 $284,197 $255,013
Type 4 19% $224,973 $254,294 $232,886
All $274,085 $329,522 $293,810
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 30 periods of data on white
males from the NLSY79.
earnings while in college, and I consequently focus on the hourly wages for these
groups instead.
In Table 4, I present generated discounted lifetime income associated with
the three educational options described above: high school, college without any
interruption or gap, and ﬁnally college following a one year gap between high
school and college.22 The results are illustrated separately for each type category
as well as aggregated across all types and are expressed in 1997 $US.
Overall, and averaged across types, the discounted present value of the earn-
ings from age 16 to 45 for agents with a high school diploma but no further
education is $274,085, while it is $329,522 if they have completed college with-
out a gap year. This corresponds to a return of around 20 percent. If, however,
the individual takes a gap year between high school and college, the discount
earnings reduce to $293,810, and this is only about 7 percent higher than the
scenario of which the individual holds only a high school degree.
However, and as clearly illustrated in Table 3, the cost of a schooling inter-
ruption (as well as the return to college) varies signiﬁcantly across individual
types. For type 2 individuals, the return to college is similar, regardless of an
interruption or not (13.4 percent versus 10.5 percent), while the diﬀerence is
22Income at any given age is given by the product of simulated hourly wages and 2,000 if
they are predicted to work at that age. I chose 2,000 hours per year as this corresponds to
full-time, full-year work and is the most common hours value reported in the data.
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signiﬁcantly higher for type 1 individuals, 13.5 percent as opposed to 1.7 per-
cent. The relative return to a college degree for those who take a gap is highest
among type 2 individuals while for those who enroll in college directly after high
school, it is highest among type 3 individuals.
7.1.2 Simulated hourly wage rates at diﬀerent ages
As mentioned above, I used simulated hourly wages when I generated sim-
ulated lifetime income. However, it is also interesting to illustrate the average
wages at diﬀerent ages (I choose 30, 40 and 45) across the three educational
options considered in this section.
The results are presented in Table 5 below where the information on age and
average hourly wages are supplemented by the percentage changes in wages for
a certain age relative to average wages for those who go to college without a gap
(third row) and those who take a gap year (fourth row). In all three options,
average wages increase with age. However, the wage growth rates are almost
twice as high for those with continuous college than for those with high school
only. For those with a gap before college, the diﬀerence is much smaller but
wages still grow faster for them than for high school graduates.
7.1.3 Simulation of wage growth and type eﬀects
In this thesis, I have presented results suggesting that an agent's expected
hourly wage rate when schooling is interrupted is much lower than he had com-
pleted his education without any interruption. However, expected wages and
wage growth is still higher for those with a college education following a gap
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Table 6: Simulated hourly wages, by education and age (in 1997 U.S. Dollars)
High School College - no gap College - gap
Age 30 40 45 30 40 45 30 40 45
Hourly wage 14.6 16.5 18 20.2 26.5 29.2 18.4 22.6 24.4
4COL%* -27.7 -37.7 -38.4 0 0 0 -8.9 -14.7 -16.4
4Colgap%** -20.7 -27.0 -26.2 9.8 17.3 19.7 0 0 0
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 30 periods of data on white
males from the NLSY79.
*Percentage diﬀerence in average wages relative to those who acquired a 4-year college
degree without a gap.
**diﬀerence in average wages relative to those who acquired a 4-year college degree
without a gap.
year than what they are for those who only completed high school. I also showed
that there exists a substantial type variation in wages. Models ignoring types
tend to underestimate wages in the options with college education, regardless
of a gap or not.
To further illustrate the importance of controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity, I show simulated wages across diﬀerent ages under two cases: i) using
my preferred model speciﬁcation with four types and ii) based on a naive model
speciﬁcation that ignores unobserved heterogeneity in Figures 10 and 11. For
this exercise, all agents completed their high school level education at age 18
and had no earnings prior to that. Hence, the income for periods one and two
(ages 16 and 17) is 0.
The long dashed line shows the growth path for agents who only received
high school level education. The short dashed line represents the scenarios
where agents completed their college degree without a gap, and the solid line
represents the wage growth path for the scenario where the agents complete the
same college degree but had a gap year before they started their college studies
(after graduating from high school).
From studying Figure 7and 8, we can identify three signiﬁcant results. First,
agents with college degrees will earn around 40 percent more than those with
70
Figure 7: Wage paths for those with a high school degree, college degree without
a gap and college degree with a gap year (4-type model)
only a high school degree. Second, agents who return to school after a gap year
will earn around 25 percent more than those with only a high school degree.
Third, those with a schooling interruption will initially have a higher income in
the ﬁrst years after college, but wage growth rate is much lower for them than
for those without a gap so that, at age 46, wages among the 'non-interrupters'
has surpassed wages among those who took a gap.
By comparing Figures 7 and 8, we can also see that the results from the naive
model provide reasonable values for those with high school only but underesti-
mate wage growth among those with a college degree, both with and without
a gap year. This bias arises even when I include a wide range of observable
characteristics, including AFQT scores and illustrates the importance of con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity in wages that is allowed to be correlated
with unobserved heterogeneity in the choices of education and working.
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Figure 8: Wage paths for those with a high school degree, college degree without
a gap and college degree with a gap year (single-type model)
7.2 Racial Diﬀerences - Males from NLSY79 and NLSY97
In this section, I will analyze both diﬀerences in the costs and beneﬁts of
taking a gap year across racial groups but also how these have changed over
time and if the changes are equal across race. As is well documented, the cost of
attending higher education such as obtaining a Bachelor's degree has increased
signiﬁcantly since the 1970s and this may have impacted the incidence of school
interruptions (students may have to take a break from studies to work and save
money for tuition and other fees).23 At the same time, the returns to higher
education have increased which may also impact school interruptions and the
decision to re-enroll.
Regarding the racial diﬀerences, this analysis is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst
to detail the incidence of and costs-beneﬁts from school interruptions across the
three major racial groups in the U.S. and how these have changed over time as
23See for instance Abel and Deitz (2014).
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access to higher education has changed.
In Table 6, I present the average hourly wages for the three educational
categories deﬁned above and separately for white, black and Hispanic males.
They are measured at age 32 which is the latest age I observe them in each
cohort and, consequently, as far from entry wages following school leaving as I
can get. The top panel shows the entries for respondents to the NLSY79 while
the bottom panel displays the same information for the respondents of NLSY97.
All wages are expressed in constant 1997 dollars.
Starting with the results for the 1979 cohort, the wage return to a 4-year
college degree without any gap in acquiring it varies from 13.6 percent for His-
panics ($16 versus $12.6) to 45 percent for blacks ($15 versus $10.4). For white
males, the return is close to 26 percent ($16.8 versus $13.3).
The corresponding wage returns for a college degree with a one year gap
show a similar racial pattern with the lowest return for Hispanics and highest
for blacks. However, as we have seen before, the magnitudes of the returns are
lower compared to college without a gap in each case. Speciﬁcally, the return for
Hispanics is 6.4 percent for Hispanics ($15 versus $12.6), 23.4 percent for blacks
($12.8 versus $10.4) and 12.6 percent ($15 versus $13.3) for whites. This is, the
relative wage diﬀerences are only about half the size of those when enrolling in
college directly from high school. Nevertheless, there are positive and signiﬁcant
returns to college, even if it follows a gap year.
For the younger, 1997 cohort, the wages are presented in the lower panel of
Table 6. Generally, as expected, there is an increase in average wages across
all groups and educational levels. However, for Hispanics the wage diﬀerences
are modest compared to those for whites. High school wages grew over this 20
year period (the 1979 wages are observed in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s while the
1997 wages are observed during the years 2011-2014) by a modest 2.7 percent
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for Hispanics and by 22 percent for whites. For blacks, the growth was even
higher at 26.9 percent but despite the higher growth, their average wage was
still below that of Hispanics.
Looking at average college wages (without interruptions), the grew by 34.5
percent for whites but much less for blacks (5.9 percent) and Hispanics (7 per-
cent). The average wages for college with a gap year, the corresponding increases
between the two cohorts are 38.9 percent for whites, 17 percent for blacks and
3.5 percent for Hispanics. One implication of these changes is that the diﬀer-
ence in mean wages for those with a college degree has increased and while white
males saw signiﬁcant growth in real wages, this was not the case for the other
groups.
The racial diﬀerences in returns to a college degree for the younger cohort
more pronounced than they are for the older cohort. The wage return to a
4-year college degree without any gap varies from 18.4 percent for Hispanics
($17.2 versus $14.5) to 39 percent for whites ($22.6 versus $16.3). Although
there is an increase for both groups, it is much larger for whites. For black
males, the return is 21 percent ($15.9 versus $13.2) which, in relative terms, is
below the corresponding return for the older cohort.
The corresponding wage returns for a college degree with a one year gap
show a similar racial pattern with the lowest return for Hispanics and highest
for whites. The magnitudes of the returns are again lower than those when
college is acquired without a gap. Speciﬁcally, the return for Hispanics is 7.2
percent ($15.6 versus $14.5), 13.8 percent for blacks ($15 versus $13.2) and
28.2 percent ($20.9 versus $16.3) for whites. Compared to the 1979 cohort, the
college return with and without a gap are higher for blacks and whites but lower
for Hispanics. In the older cohort, the college return with a gap year was around
50 percent of the return without a gap. For whites from the younger cohort, the
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Table 7: Average Hourly Wages at Age 32 (in 1997 U.S. dollars)
NLSY79
High School College - no gap College - gap
White $13.3 $16.8 $15.0
Black $10.4 $15.5 $13.8
Hispanic $10.6 $16.0 $13.0
NLSY97
High School College - no gap College - gap
White $18.3 $21.6 $20.5
Black $14.2 $18.9 $17.5
Hispanic $13.5 $18.1 $18.0
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from the
NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively.
diﬀerence between the two college returns is smaller, around 25 percent while
for blacks, it is around 33 percent.
To summarize, there is a wage gain associated with completing a 4-year
college degree and it is higher if students do not interrupt their studies. However,
even if they do, there is a signiﬁcant wage return. Moreover, the returns have
become closer over time for whites and blacks making the return to college
relatively more beneﬁcial now than in the past. Finally, the college returns are
lowest for Hispanics, regardless of the presence of a gap or not and this group
also experience the lowest growth in average wages over time.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show expected wage growth paths for the three diﬀerent
racial groups under the three diﬀerent counterfactual scenarios discussed above
using data from NLSY97. The vertical axis shows the hourly wage (in U.S. 1997
dollars), and the horizontal axis shows the decision horizon which is starts at
age 16 and ends at age 33. In the ﬁrst scenario, all agents complete their high
school level education on time at age 18 and have no wages before that age.
Hence, wages for periods 1 and 2 (ages 16 and 17) are 0. The solid line is the
growth path for white males, the dashed line is the wage growth path for black
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males and the dotted line is the wage path for Hispanic males. Over the 15
years following high school, wages grow the most for whites (from just below
$10 the ﬁrst year after high school to almost $20 at age 33, corresponding to an
annual growth rate of around 6.5 percent) and the least (in fact, almost not at
all) for blacks.
In scenario 2, agents enroll in college directly after high school and complete
a 4-year degree. Again, it is assumed that they are not working while in school.
The pattern across the racial groups from above remains, with white showing
the highest growth and black the lowest. Over the ﬁrst 11 years after college,
expected wages grow by around 6 percent per year for white males and by about
half of that for black males. Compared to the paths for the high school scenario,
the variation in wage growth rates across the racial groups is much smaller in
the college educated case. Further, like the high school case, initial wages are
compressed and very similar for whites, blacks and Hispanics.
Finally, in scenario 3, agents complete a 4-year college but have a gap year
before they enroll in college. The wage received between high school and college
is similar for the three groups as this corresponding to the initial wage following
high school described above, which display very little variation across race.
Following college graduation, wage grow somewhat less than those for college
graduates without a gap year. For whites (the group with the highest growth
rates), wages grow by around 4.5 percent per year, and again by about half of
this rate for black males. Even though the growth rates are lower in this case,
the initial wages after college graduation are somewhat higher that for those
without a gap.
To summarize, there are two main conclusions from this exercise. First, in-
dividuals start with similar wages in all counterfactual scenarios, but the growth
rate of white males is much higher than that of black and Hispanic males. Sec-
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Figure 9: Simulated wage paths for the case with high school only, by racial
group.
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from
NLSY97.
ond, the diﬀerence in growth rates is more signiﬁcant in the high school only
scenario than in those involving a college education, which suggests that as
educational levels increase, the wage gap between racial groups is reduced.
7.3 Policy Simulation
The ﬁrst set of results presented in this section for white males from the
NLSY79 showed that individuals gained a 7 percent increase in expected, dis-
counted lifetime income if they return to school and increase their educational
attainment, which also means increased output for the entire economy. Hence,
it is natural for policymakers to consider alternative ways to encourage indi-
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Figure 10: Simulated wage paths for the case with a 4-year college degree with-
out a gap year, by racial group.
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from
NLSY97.
Figure 11: Simulated wage paths for the case with a 4-year college degree with
a gap year, by racial group.
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from
NLSY97.
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viduals without higher education to return to school and gain a college-level
education. In my model, individuals choose to enroll in school if the present
value of schooling at the beginning of that period (t),V si;t, is larger than the
present values of the other options, working (V ei;t) and NEET(V
h
i;t). From the
literature, the most cost-eﬀective treatment to increase educational attainment
is school performance-based subsidies which aim to reduce the educational cost.
In this subsection, I present results from a policy simulation whereby I in-
crease family income of individuals enrolling in college-level education. I sim-
ulate the eﬀects of annual government subsidies in the amounts of: $20,000,
$25,000 and $30,000. Speciﬁcally, I modify the utility of enrolling in school by
increasing family income by one of the amounts above if individuals enroll in
a college-level education and for a maximum of four years. In the case of a
$20,000 subsidy, the instant utility function of schooling in time period t is:
U^si;t = bsm + Xibsx + abilityibab + bsgdst 1i;t + bsgddgapdui;t
+^sds1dsi;t (1) + 
s
ds2dsi;t (2) + ^
s
ds3dsi;t (3) + ^
s
ds4dsi;t (4)
+bsinc(Homeincome+ $20; 000)+ "si;t;
(23)
where X is the array of all the background characteristic variables except
home (or family) income.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 7 below. The ﬁrst row
shows how the highest grade completed change as the subsidy increases and
the impacts are quite modest which is not surprising as this subsidy have little
impact on the majority of individuals who at most complete high school.24 With
a $30,000 annual subsidy, the highest grade completed is predicted to increase
24It is possible that a college subsidy may increase high school graduation rates among
forward looking individuals. In my simulations, the high school graduation rates were however
unchanged.
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Table 8: Simulated impacts of alternative college subsidies - white males from
NLSY79
Baseline Annual subsidy amounts
$20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Highest Grade Completed 13.29 13.45 13.47 13.51
%4 in HGC - 1.2 1.4 1.7
Hourly Wage 24.6 25.6 25.7 26
%4 Hourly Wage - 4.1 4.5 5.7
Two-year College 37.95 40.95 41.28 41.76
%4 Two-year College - 7.9 8.8 10.0
Four-year College 19.02 20.85 21.52 22.19
%4 Four-year College - 9.6 13.1 16.7
Proportion with a gap year 40.63 41.92 42.26 42.16
%4 Proportion with a gap - 3.20 4.0 3.8
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 33 periods of data on from
NLSY79. In 1997 U.S. dollars.
by 1.7 percent.
In terms of wage impacts, the subsidies are expected to increase hourly
wages as education increases, measured as late as possible which for these data
means at age 46, by 4.1 percent (for the $20,000 subsidy) and by 5.7 percent
for the $30,000 subsidy). These wage increases follow from improved enrollment
and graduation rates from college and this, not surprisingly, where the largest
impacts are observed. For the $30,000 subsidy, the proportion of individuals
with at least two years of college increase with 10 percent. For the same subsidy
level, the proportion of individuals with at least four years of college increase
with close to 17 percent.
Lastly, I use the simulations to assess the impact on school interruptions
between high school and college. As hypothesized before, a college subsidy
may both increase and decrease the incidence of an interruption. An increase
may occur if individuals have strong preferences against higher education after
completing high school and choose to leave school. However, the subsidy may
bring them back to school by increasing the value of the school option. Similarly,
a college subsidy may decrease the interruption rates by aﬀording potential
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college students to enroll directly after high school instead of taking a year
of to work and save money to pay for college. The entries in the table show
that interruptions increase marginally, by 3-4 percent depending on the subsidy
amount. Thus, making college more aﬀordable appears to bring students back
to school, increase the proportion of workers with a college degree and improve
their average wages.
In Figure 12 I plot the percentage changes in the outcomes considered in
Table 7 for six diﬀerent subsidy amounts. In addition to those presented in
table 7, I also simulated the eﬀects of subsidies equal to $3,500, $5,000 and
$10,000. The ﬁgure clearly shows that the impact, regardless of subsidy level, is
largest for the four-year college option (the solid line) and that its eﬀect grows
with the magnitude of the subsidy. The proportions with two-year and four-year
college degrees increase as well and, in magnitudes, in the same way (most for
Hispanics and least for whites).
The results above were obtained for the long panel of white males from
the NLSY79 cohort. Below, I present the corresponding information for the
three racial groups for both cohorts (NLSY79 and NLSY97) for the subsidy
amount of $20,000. Starting with NLSY79, the entries in Table 8 below show
an increase in the average highest grade completed for all three groups, with the
largest increase for Hispanics (2.3 percent). The wage eﬀects are also positive
for all groups and again largest for Hispanics (an increase with 7.3 percent,
followed by blacks at 5.3 percent and smallest for white males at 4.1 percent).
The proportion of individuals with at least two years of college increase with
7.9 percent for whites, 10.4 percent for blacks and 13.3 percent for Hispanics.
The corresponding proportion of individuals with at least four years of college
increase with close to 9.6 percent for whites, 13.7 percent for blacks and 15.6
percent for Hispanics. Finally, the table entries show that interruptions increase
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Figure 12: Simulated impacts of alternative college subsidies - white males from
NLSY79
Note: The graph is based on a model that use up to 33 periods of data on from
NLSY79. The diﬀerent lines show predicted changes in diﬀerent outcomes (highest
grade completed (Sch.), two-year college (Col+), four-year college (Uni+), hourly wage
($/hr) and school interruption (gap)) relative to the baseline with no subsidy as the
value of the subsidy increases. In 1997 U.S. dollars.
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Table 9: Simulated impacts of alternative college subsidies - males from NLSY79
White Black Hispanic
Outcome Baseline $20,000 Baseline $20,000 Baseline $20,000
Highest Grade Completed 13.3 13.5 12.3 12.3 11.9 12.2
%4 in HGC - 1.0 - 0.7 - 2.3
Hourly Wage 24.6 25.6 15.9 16.8 17.0 18.2
%4 Hourly Wage - 4.1 - 5.3 - 7.3
Two-year College 38.0 41.0 16.0 17.6 13.6 15.4
%4 Two-year College - 7.9 - 10.4 - 13.3
Four-year College 19.0 20.8 11.9 13.5 9.9 11.5
%4 Four-year College - 9.6 - 13.7 - 15.6
Proportion with a gap year 40.6 41.9 38.5 39.1 36.7 38.7
%4 Proportion with a gap - 3.2 - 1.5 - 5.3
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from
NLSY79. In 1997 U.S. dollars.
marginally, by 1.5 percent for blacks, 3.2 percent for whites and 5.3 percent for
Hispanics. Thus, much of the educational improvement following the subsidy
arises because students are incentivized to re-enroll in school and attend (and
complete) college and this eﬀect is the largest for Hispanic students, who have
the lowest college graduation rates in the data.
In Table 9 below, I present the corresponding information for the three racial
groups for the younger cohort (NLSY97) for the subsidy amount of $20,000.
The entries in the ﬁrst row show a modest increase in the average highest grade
completed for all three groups, around one percent for all groups. The wage
eﬀects are also positive for all groups and largest for Hispanics (an increase with
10.1 percent, followed by blacks at 9.8 percent and smallest for white males at
7.1 percent). These wage gains are larger than those obtained for the older
cohort above. The proportion of individuals with at least two years of college
increase with 11.3 percent for whites, 14.3 percent for blacks and 18.3 percent
for Hispanics. The corresponding proportion of individuals with at least four
years of college increase with close to 12.1 percent for whites, 9.1 percent for
blacks and 10.2 percent for Hispanics.
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Table 10: Simulated impacts of alternative college subsidies - males from
NLSY97
White Black Hispanic
Outcome Baseline $20,000 Baseline $20,000 Baseline $20,000
Highest Grade Completed 14.1 14.3 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8
%4 in HGC - 1.0 - 1.1 - 1.1
Hourly Wage 26.7 28.6 20.8 22.8 22.8 25.1
%4 Hourly Wage - 7.1 - 9.8 - 10.1
Two-year College 45.7 50.9 29.4 33.6 27.1 32.1
%4 Two-year College - 11.3 - 14.3 - 18.3
Four-year College 28.6 32.1 16.1 17.6 16.5 18.2
%4 Four-year College - 12.1 - 9.1 - 10.2
Proportion with a gap year 41.5 43.6 38.4 40.8 44.8 48.1
%4 Proportion with a gap - 5.1 - 6.3 - 7.4
Note: The entries are based on a model that use up to 17 periods of data on from
NLSY97. In 1997 U.S. dollars.
Finally, the table entries show that interruptions increase more for this cohort
than for the 1979 cohort. As before, the increase is smallest for whites (5.1
percent), larger for blacks (6.3 percent) and largest for Hispanics (7.4 percent).
Thus, close to half the Hispanic males are predicted to return to school following
an interruption with the introduction of a $20,000 college subsidy. Generally,
the estimated reactions are larger for the 1997 cohort than for the older one,
possibly due to the increased value associated with education more recently.
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have provided new evidence on the cost and beneﬁts asso-
ciated with an interruption to schooling investments. This topic has recently
attracted much attention, especially given the increase in the cost of higher edu-
cation over the last couple of decades. I specify and estimate a dynamic, discrete
choice model that includes a very ﬂexible wage function. It allows the estima-
tion of diﬀerent wage growth rates before and after a schooling interruption (or
between those who interrupt and those who do not).
In one set of analysis, I use data from the 1979 cohort of the NLSY which
allows me to analyze the long-term eﬀects of a schooling interruption since I
can follow workers from age 16 to their late 40s. It contrasts many of the
previous studies which have utilized data with information on labor market
outcomes immediately after graduation. I also utilize data from the 1997 cohort
of the NLSY to analyze if the incidence, as well as the cost and beneﬁts of
an interruption, has changed over time. I also use data from both cohorts to
compare racial diﬀerences in school interruptions and their eﬀects.
The predictions generated by my model, along with other dimensions in-
cluding the decision to interrupt school and wages, are very similar to those
observed in the data. I am therefore conﬁdent that the model can be used to
analyze diﬀerent counterfactual policies. In this paper, I argue that the decision
to interrupt schooling is endogenous, as is education and work experience, and
ignoring this may contaminate the estimation results. I show that a tempo-
rary interruption to schooling has a negative eﬀect on an agent's future income
compared to completing the same level of education without interruption. The
diﬀerence in present value earnings, assuming a one-year interruption during
which the individual is working, varies across individuals, and can be as low
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as $5,000 over a 30 year period and as high as $48,000, over the same period.
However, it is considerably higher for agents with only high school degrees.
From policy simulation, I ﬁnd that under a post-secondary study subsidy,
more agents will make a choice to return to school and obtain a post-secondary
degree, and the hourly wage will also increase considerably. This thesis provides
quantitative evidence on the eﬀect of a college-level subsidy on the racial dif-
ferences in wages and schooling between white, black and Hispanic males. The
results demonstrated that a conditional (upon college enrollment) subsidy could
signiﬁcantly increase schooling attainment for all three racial groups but more
so for the underprivileged groups and consequently help reduce racial wage and
employment gaps. Although most of the results I present focus on interruptions
between high school and college, my model is more general than that, and it
allows for the possibility of interruption at any school level.
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* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
96















* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 15: MLE estimates from the dynamic model
NLSY79 (30priods) NLSY79 (17periods) NLSY97 (17periods)
Parameters Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err)
asm=1 6.1185* 5.1276* 4.8108*
(0.3014) (0.5564) (0.4220)
asm=2 1.0375 * 1.7910* 1.5277*
(0.2759 ) (0.5899) (0.4307)
asm=3 6.2248 * 3.9839* 8.2042 *
(0.2969) (0.5536) (1.4001)
asm=4 2.1085 * 5.2616* 2.4760 *
(0.2840) (0.6996) (0.5452)
sds1 -1.9122* -1.7751* 0.2937*
(0.0854) (0.1653) (0.1038)
sds2 -0.5961* -0.2501 -1.6519*
(0.1150) (0.2698) (0.1144)
sds3 -0.7583* -0.3755 -1.3869*
(0.1606) (0.3950) (0.1474)
sds4 -0.8403* -0.4315 -3.1281*
(0.2242) (0.6040) (0.1778)
ascog 0.6444 * 0.5860* 0.3774*
(0.0515) (0.0676) (0.0582)
sSnisb -0.0505* -0.0595* -0.0166
(0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0243)
sSnuclear 0.2647* 0.2604* 0.2795*
(0.0726) (0.0750) (0.0584)
sSsouth -0.0060 -0.0105 -0.1088
(0.0447) (0.0612) (0.0589)
sSrural 0.0231 0.0174 -0.0034
(0.0579) (0.0627) (0.0563)
sShgcf 0.0577* 0.0616* 0.0796*
(0.0108) (0.0122) (0.0116)
sShgcm 0.0575* 0.0688* 0.0768*
(0.0142) (0.0157) (0.0127)
sShomeincome 0.0036* 0.0034* 0.0056*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 16: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 1
NLSY79 (30periods) NLSY79 (17periods) NLSY97 (17periods)
Parameters Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err)
sIt 1 -2.2025* -1.9866* -2.8391*
(0.0647) (0.0772) (0.0773)
sgapdur 0.0541 0.0317 0.0920
(0.1350) (0.1060) (0.1531)
aem=1 0.2389 -1.7467 3.5424*
(0.3841) (1.0630) (0.4669)
aem=2 -5.7032* -5.2139* 0.0838
(0.3896) (1.1360) (0.5429)
aem=3 0.2682 -2.4784* 7.7656*
(0.4037) (1.0827) (1.3864)
aem=4 -3.3910* -1.0887 2.5239*
(0.3805) (1.2739) (0.6436)
eeduc 0.3053* 0.3580* 0.1070*
(0.0258) (0.0668) (0.0179)
eexp 0.2037* 0.4380* 0.2869*
(0.0104) (0.0249) (0.0244)
ecog 0.0524 -0.0475 - 0.0053
(0.0451) (0.0647) (0.0562)
awm=1 2.1116 2.2864* 2.7148*
(0.0237) (0.0334) (0.2585)
awm=2 1.9143 1.9043* 1.9166*
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0309)
awm=3 1.6126* 1.5134* 1.9494*
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0374)
awm=4 1.8476* 1.8951* 1.8219*
(0.0225) (0.0306) (0.0251)
wS1=1 0.1340* 0.0982* -0.0496*
(0.0222) (0.0270) (0.0173)
wS1=2 0.1890* 0.1858* 0.0162
(0.0298) (0.0382) (0.0171)
wS1=3 0.5049* 0.4209* 0.1140*
(0.0305) (0.0375) (0.0214)
* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 17: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 2
NLSY79 (30periods) NLSY79 (WhiteMale17periods) NLSY97 (17periods)
Parameters Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err)
wS1=4 0.7357* 0.6114* 0.3372*
(0.0495) (0.0640) (0.0236)
wS2=1 0.0767* -0.0246 0.1558
(0.0313) (0.0379) (0.0976)
wS2=2 0.0834* 0.0519 0.0314*
(0.0213) (0.0304) (0.0474)
wS2=3 0.1205* 0.1164* 0.0632*
(0.0136) (0.0163) (0.0177)
wS2=4 0.1275* 0.1031* 0.0696*
(0.0095) (0.0210) (0.0107)
wcog 0.0420* 0.0394* 0.0345*
(0.0083) (0.0101) (0.0119)
we1 0.0492* 0.0771* 0.0983*
(0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0067)
we2 0.0538* 0.0808* 0.0997*
(0.0041) (0.0088) (0.0136)
wc12 -0.0011* -0.0029* -0.0043*
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0005)
wc22 -0.0014* -0.0047* -0.0028*
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0013)
we1s1=12 0.0040 0.0011 0.0114
(0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0068)
we1s1=13=14 0.0061* 0.0049 0.0065*
(0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0068)
we1s1=15=16 0.0201* 0.0112* 0.0205*
(0.0026) (0.0054) (0.0026)
we1s1=16+ 0.0114* 0.0059* 0.0100*
(0.0048) (0.0121) (0.0076)
we1s2=12 -0.0327* -0.0086 -0.0185
(0.0102) (0.0128) (0.0227)
we1s2=13=14 -0.0058* -0.0208* -0.0308*
(0.0030) (0.0063) (0.0159)
* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 18: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 3
NLSY79 (30periods) NLSY79 (17periods) NLSY97 (17periods)
Parameters Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err) Estimates (Std.err)
we1s2=15=16 -0.0254* -0.0303* -0.0184*
(0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0055)
we1s2=16+ -0.0247* -0.0355* -0.0196*
(0.0027) (0.0095) (0.0042)
we2s2=12 0.0049 0.0270* -0.0531*
(0.0039) (0.0078) (0.0178)
we2s2=13=14 0.0036 0.0225* -0.0103
(0.0033) (0.0071) (0.0123)
we2s2=15=16 0.0156* 0.0134 -0.0019 *
(0.0033) (0.0075) (0.0110)
we2s2=16+ 0.0074* 0.0198 -0.0265*
(0.0034) (0.0107) (0.0104)
* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 19: MLE estimates from the dynamic model
NLSY79 (Black) NLSY97 (Black)

































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
102
Table 20: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 1
NLSY79 (Black) NLSY97 (Black)

































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 21: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 2
NLSY79 (Black) NLSY97 (Black)































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 22: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 3
NLSY79 (Black) NLSY97 (Black)













* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 23: MLE estimates from the dynamic model
NLSY79 (Hisp.) NLSY97 (Hisp.)

































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 24: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 1
NLSY79 (Hisp.) NLSY97 (Hisp.)































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 25: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 2
NLSY79 (Hisp.) NLSY97 (Hisp.)































* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 26: MLE estimates from the dynamic model Con't 3
NLSY79 (Hisp.) NLSY97 (Hisp.)













* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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Table 27: Wage Simulation (4-type model)
Age HS (4-type) Col (4-type) Col_gap (4-type)
16 0 0 0
17 0 0 0
18 8.856 0 8.856
19 9.562 0 0
20 10.037 0 0
21 10.565 0 0
22 11.021 13.219 0
23 11.604 14.191 13.774
24 12.161 15.11 14.56
25 12.455 15.727 15
26 12.822 16.463 15.552
27 13.259 17.38 16.252
28 13.56 18.009 16.729
29 14.201 19.168 17.722
30 14.63 20.208 18.422
31 14.884 20.796 18.886
32 15.34 21.878 19.671
33 15.246 22.073 19.77
34 15.818 23.367 20.714
35 15.938 23.908 21.08
36 16.215 24.815 21.688
37 16.067 25.017 21.695
38 16.344 25.756 22.296
39 16.483 26.149 22.545
40 16.516 26.508 22.668
41 16.778 27.295 22.895
42 16.881 28.054 23.352
43 17.1 28.566 23.698
44 17.33 28.786 23.749
45 17.959 29.171 24.446
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Table 28: Wage Simulation (no-type model)
Age High School University University (gap)
16 0 0 0
17 0 0 0
18 8.814 0 8.814
19 9.474 0 0
20 9.875 0 0
21 10.354 0 0
22 10.772 12.568 0
23 11.343 13.429 12.717
24 11.919 14.369 13.421
25 12.167 14.857 13.69
26 12.476 15.484 14.078
27 13.029 16.448 14.754
28 13.37 17.185 15.282
29 13.85 18.088 15.961
30 14.397 19.075 16.658
31 14.661 19.721 17.103
32 15.171 20.749 17.852
33 15.17 21.123 18.057
34 15.666 22.091 18.797
35 15.893 22.799 19.239
36 16.148 23.6 19.776
37 16.082 23.822 19.871
38 16.498 24.879 20.66
39 16.574 25.344 20.907
40 16.689 25.435 20.931
41 16.478 26.006 21.271
42 16.634 26.61 21.659
43 16.803 27.117 22.08
44 17.551 27.25 22.087
45 18.274 27.592 22.903
Table 29: Present Values (4-type)
Age HS (4-type) Col (4-type) Col_gap (4-type)
Total $789,204 $1,061,028 $929,840
npv30years $197,434.92 $173,300.16 $160,787.29
npv40years $314,603.50 $349,864.65 $316,258.71
npv45years $356,310.91 $421,787.66 $376,077.36
ln(npv30years) 5.30 5.24 5.21
ln(npv40years) 5.50 5.54 5.50
ln(npv45years) 5.55 5.63 5.58
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Table 30: Present values (no-type)
Age HS (4-type) Col (4-type) Col_gap (4-type)
Total $785,664 $1,010,282 $855,136
npv30years $193,834.98 $164,082.18 $147,804.47
npv40years $310,779.46 $332,647.99 $289,999.90
npv45years $356,310.91 $401,143.05 $345,699.66
ln(npv30years) 5.29 5.242 5.17
ln(npv40years) 5.49 5.52 5.46
ln(npv45years) 5.55 5.60 5.54
Table 31: Policy implication on hourly wages (in 1997 U.S. dollar )
































Table 32: Wage Simulation (White_17periods)
Age 79Col 79Col_gap 97Col 97Col_gap
19 0 7.958 0 8.856
20 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0
23 10.699 0 12.745 0
24 11.442 11.285 13.499 13.647
25 11.837 11.578 14.702 14.912
26 12.37 12.012 15.633 16.003
27 13.1 12.638 16.686 17.022
28 13.779 13.204 17.458 17.870
29 14.569 13.888 18.603 19.253
30 15.357 14.548 18.391 19.548
31 15.908 15.004 19.868 21.629
32 16.767 15.741 22.557 14.185
Table 33: Wage Simulation (Black_17periods)
Age 79Col 79Col_gap 97Col 97Col_gap
19 0 8.252 0 8.381
20 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0
23 10.639 0 9.864 0
24 11.771 11.879 11.309 11.717
25 12.126 11.831 11.344 11.339
26 12.246 12.144 12.397 12.326
27 12.615 12.573 12.660 12.346
28 13.279 13.250 13.652 13.632
29 13.577 13.577 16.262 15.632
30 13.968 13.968 14.918 14.801
31 14.588 14.588 15.570 15.471
32 14.990 14.990 15.912 15.995
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Table 34: Wage Simulation (Hisp._17periods)
Age 79Col 79Col_gap 97Col 97Col_gap
19 0 8.277 0 8.429
20 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0
23 10.475 0 10.639 0
24 10.800 10.844 11.740 11.785
25 11.649 11.531 12.276 12.330
26 12.736 12.590 13.457 13.593
27 13.300 13.193 14.024 14.216
28 14.338 14.195 15.125 15.576
29 15.447 15.328 16.054 16.272
30 15.822 15.729 17.684 17.787
31 17.183 17.057 17.471 17.606
32 16.941 16.736 17.171 17.556
Figure 13: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of Pre-gap School
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Figure 14: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of Post-gap School
Figure 15: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of Pre-gap Work
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Figure 16: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of Post-gap Work
Figure 17: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of NEET
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Figure 18: NLSY79 (White) Proportion of Schooling Interruption
Figure 19: NLSY79 (White) Hourly Wage (1997 US dollars)
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Figure 20: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of Pre-gap School
Figure 21: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of Post-gap School
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Figure 22: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of Pre-gap Work
Figure 23: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of Post-gap Work
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Figure 24: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of NEET
Figure 25: NLSY97 (White) Proportion of Schooling Interruption
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Figure 26: NLSY97 (White) Hourly Wage (1997 US dollars)
Figure 27: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of Pre-gap School
121
Figure 28: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of Post-gap School
Figure 29: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of Pre-gap Work
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Figure 30: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of Post-gap Work
Figure 31: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of NEET
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Figure 32: NLSY79 (Black) Proportion of Schooling Interruption
Figure 33: NLSY79 (Black) Hourly Wage (1997 US Dollar)
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Figure 34: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of Pre-gap School
Figure 35: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of Post-gap School
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Figure 36: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of Pre-gap Working
Figure 37: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of Post-gap Working
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Figure 38: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of NEET
Figure 39: NLSY97 (Black) Proportion of Schooling Interruption
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Figure 40: NLSY97 (Black) Hourly Wage (1997 US Dollar)
Figure 41: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Proportion of Pre-gap School
128
Figure 42: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Proportion of Post-gap School
Figure 43: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Proportion of Pre-gap Working
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Figure 44: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Proportion of Post-gap Working
Figure 45: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Proportion of NEET
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Figure 46: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Rate of Schooling Interruption
Figure 47: NLSY79 (Hisp.) Hourly Wage (1997 US Dollar)
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Figure 48: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of Pre-gap School
Figure 49: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of Post-gap School
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Figure 50: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of Pre-gap Working
Figure 51: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of Post-gap Working
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Figure 52: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of NEET
Figure 53: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Proportion of Schooling Interruption
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Figure 54: NLSY97 (Hisp.) Hourly Wage (1997 US Dollar)
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